

7 OCTOBER 1947

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Tuesday, 7 October 1947

- - -

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST  
Court House of the Tribunal  
War Ministry Building  
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
at 0930.

- - -

Appearances:

For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with  
the exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE R. B. PAL, Member  
from India and HONORABLE JUSTICE HENRI BERNARD, Member  
from the Republic of France, not sitting from 0930 to  
1600.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

- - -

(English to Japanese and Japanese  
to English interpretation was made by the  
Language Section, IMTFE.)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 Y O S H I M A S A O K A D A, called as a witness on  
4 behalf of the defense, resumed the stand and tes-  
5 tified through Japanese interpreters as follows:  
6

7 DIRECT EXAMINATION

8 BY MR. BANNO (Continued):

9 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. BANNO.

10 MR. BANNO: I concluded yesterday the direct  
11 examination of the witness OKADA. The prosecution  
12 may cross-examine if they desire to do so.

13 JUDGE KWEI: May it please your Honor, the  
14 prosecution does not propose to examine this witness.

15 MR. BANNO: There is no redirect examination.  
16 May the witness be excused on the usual terms?

17 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused accordingly.

18 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

19 MR. BANNO: Next, changing my order, I go  
20 into No. 33 on my order of proof, and present defense  
21 document 1970. This is a certificate regarding the  
22 absence of the written instructions issued by the Army  
23 Section of the Imperial Headquarters on July 5, 1940,  
24 which will be referred to in the testimony of the  
25 witness who is to follow.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

2 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1970  
3 will receive exhibit No. 3306.

4 (Whereupon, the document above  
5 referred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
6 3306 and received in evidence.)

7 MR. BANNO: I shall read exhibit 3306:

8 "Certificate of Authenticity.

9 "I hereby certify that the original of the  
10 orders 'Removal of the South China Area Army from  
11 the Order of Battle of the China Expeditionary Force  
12 etc.' was in the custody of the Army Department of  
13 the Imperial Headquarters (General Staff Office) but  
14 was destroyed by burning at the time of the cessation  
15 of hostilities and is no longer in existence.

16 "At Tokyo, this 5th day of the 22nd year of  
17 SHOWA (1947)"

18 Signed "MIYAMA, Yazo, Chief of the Archives  
19 Section of the First Demobilization Bureau."

20 THE PRESIDENT: That is a certificate of  
21 destruction.

22 MR. BANNO: I call as my next witness  
23 SAWADA, Shigeru.  
24  
25

1 S H I G E R U S A W A D A, recalled as a witness  
2 on behalf of the defense, having been previously  
3 sworn, testified through Japanese interpreters  
4 as follows:

5 THE PRESIDENT: You are still on your former  
6 oath.

7 DIRECT EXAMINATION

8 BY MR. BANNO:

9 Q Will you state your full name?

10 A SAWADA, Shigeru.

11 MR. BANNO: May the witness be shown defense  
12 document 1977?

13 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
14 to the witness.)

15 Q Is that your affidavit, bearing your sig-  
16 nature?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Are the contents thereof true and correct?

19 A Yes.

20 MR. BANNO: I tender defense document 1977  
21 in evidence.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 1977  
24 will receive exhibit No. 3306-A.

25 (Whereupon, the document above

1 referred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
2 3306-A and received in evidence.)

3 MR. BANNO: I shall read exhibit 3306-A:

4 "1. -- I (SAWADA, Shigeru) was Lieutenant  
5 General at the time of the conclusion of the war and  
6 am detained now in Sugamo Prison. I held office as  
7 Vice-Chief of the General Staff from October 1939  
8 (14th year of Showa) to November 1940 (15th year of  
9 Showa).

10 "2. -- During my tenure of office as Vice-  
11 Chief of the General Staff, General Headquarters had  
12 to take the Army for South China away from the command  
13 of the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary  
14 Force (having put its military strength under the  
15 direct command of the General Headquarters).

16 "3. -- I know the above fact quite well be-  
17 cause I myself took charge of the matter as Vice-  
18 Chief of the General Staff."

19 You may cross-examine.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Judge Kwei.

21 JUDGE KWEI: If your Honor please, we will  
22 not cross-examine this witness.

23 MR. BANNO: May the witness be excused on  
24 the usual terms?

25 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused accordingly.

1 (Whereupon, the witness was ex-  
2 cused.)

3 MR. BANNO: My colleague, Counsel SASAGAWA,  
4 will continue the case.

5 MR. SASAGAWA: May it please the Tribunal,  
6 I now wish to call the witness IHARA, Junjiro, whose  
7 affidavit is defense document No. 2039.

25

1 J U N J I R O I H A R A, called as a witness on  
2 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,  
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as  
4 follows:

5 DIRECT EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. SASAGAWA:

7 Q Will you state your name and address?

8 A My name is IHARA, Junjiro. My address is  
9 No. 27 Akamatsu-cho, Saga-city.

10 MR. SASAGAWA: Please show the witness de-  
11 fense document 2039.

12 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
13 to the witness.)

14 Q Is that your affidavit?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Are the contents of the affidavit true and  
17 correct?

18 A They are.

19 MR. SASAGAWA: I offer for evidence defense  
20 document No. 2039.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2039  
23 will receive exhibit No. 3307.

24 (Whereupon, the document above  
25 referred to was marked defense exhibit No.

1 3307 and received in evidence.)

2 MR. SASAGAWA: I read exhibit No. 3307,  
3 affidavit of IHARA, Junjiro:

4 "1. I was the Chief of the Staff of Korean  
5 Army from July 9, 1942 to February 10, 1945, and the  
6 Chief of the 17th Area Army and of the Korean District  
7 Army from February 11th to the end of the war.

8 "My rank, at the end of the war, was  
9 Lieutenant-General.

10 "I now live at No. 27 Akamatsu-cho, Saga-  
11 city.

12 "2. When I arrived at the post as the Chief  
13 of the Staff of the Korean Army it was already decided  
14 that about one thousand prisoners of war should be  
15 kept in Korea, and staff of the camps had already  
16 arrived and organized. While awaiting for their  
17 arrival camps were either built newly or reconstructed  
18 and preparations were made concerning treatment of war  
19 prisoners.  
20

21 "3. The principal building of the camps was  
22 selected at the place about five hundred meters away  
23 to the northwest from the Headquarters of the Korean  
24 Army at Ryuzan-cho Keijo-fu. The building was made of  
25 brick with four stories, and we rebuilt and equipped  
it so that it might be fit for living. There were

less Koreans' houses around it than other buildings and the surrounding was quiet with little traffic and good for management and health.

"The Jinsen branch camp was established newly near the seashore on a high and dry place and convenient for management and good for health.

"Konan branch camp which was built especially on a high and dry hill, which was to the west of the factory of Nippon Nitrogen Company, was convenient for management and good for health and suitable for works.

"4. As prisoners are apt to get in touch with outside people and collect information or buy foul food, we avoided crowded place for camps that we could protect them from mismanagement.

"We never chose a place for the purpose of propaganda to Koreans or putting affront upon prisoners.

"As for the places of work for prisoners, we kept away from crowded places or bustling streets in the city and chose quiet places in the suburbs. And if the place were far from the camps, we transported them by cars and did not make them walk. Thus we tried to protect prisoners' dignity. This policy was far from propaganda, and it was rather in contrast to it.

1 "5. The report presented by 'Reaction of  
2 General Public on the Internment of English Prisoners  
3 of War' (Exhibit 1975) is one of the customary reports  
4 presented to the War Ministry for its information by  
5 the Army Staff Office collecting regular reports from  
6 gendarmeries in Korea, military affairs sections of  
7 various places, station headquarters and commissariats  
8 and reports from the guards section of the Government of  
9 Korea. The above reports by detachments were not collect-  
10 ed by orders of the Army, nor, of course, by instruc-  
11 tions or requests of the War Ministry. They were ad-  
12 dressed to the vice minister of war from the Chief of  
13 Staff because it was a custom of the Army to address  
14 documents or dispatches of secondary importance to and  
15 from the vice minister and chief of staff.

16 "The above report was never made public.

17 "6. Rules and instructions of Korean Army  
18 about the treatment of prisoners of war were formed  
19 according to the prisoner of war regulations about their  
20 internment and treatment, and other instructions and  
21 orders issued by the Central Government according to the  
22 explanations by the Chief of the POW Management Bureau  
23 and by other officials made on the occasion of the meet-  
24 ings of the chiefs of the POW camps, and also with a  
25 consideration that it may fit the situations in Korea.

1 "The punishments of war prisoners were execu-  
2 ted according to War Prisoners' Punishment Law.

3 "7. When we asked the War Minister for the  
4 labours of prisoners we investigated carefully that they  
5 might not be against rules and regulations or humanity  
6 and also considered full to protect and secure military  
7 secrets and did not let them have to do with labours in  
8 direct operational works.

9 "8. General ITAGAKI, the Army Commander, was  
10 concerned about the English prisoners who were to come  
11 to Korea in cold weather and into the different condi-  
12 tions after they got used to warm weather of the south  
13 area, that it might affect their health.

14 "Considering also that all of them must have  
15 become weak and some might be sick as a result of the  
16 long voyage of more than forty days, he gave his men  
17 instructions, especially about the recuperation and  
18 preservation of POW's health and instructed them to be  
19 particularly careful about the position of the camps  
20 and the equipment. Besides making me, the Chief of  
21 Staff, to inspect the barracks, he himself examined the  
22 inside and outside of the buildings and equipment with  
23 his staff officers and adjutant.

24 "He gave instructions to the Commander of the  
25 Camp and staff of the intendance corps who took charge

1 of constructions.

2 "General ITAGAKI often consulted with me about  
3 the treatment of prisoners of war and gave me instruc-  
4 tions about their food, clothes and medical treatments.

5 "For instance, about their rations, he told me  
6 to give them as much nutritive value as Japanese soldiers,  
7 but at the same time give them much food suitable for  
8 their taste or let them cook materials according to their  
9 liking.

10 "Then we gave them medical treatments their own  
11 medical men were allowed to be present and consulted in  
12 treatment."

13 "With the Tribunal's permission may I ask a  
14 couple of questions?"

15 BY MR. SASAGAWA (Continued):

16 Q Mr. IHARA, were there any occasions in which  
17 the Chief of Staff decided matters on behalf of a com-  
18 mander in chief?

19 A Yes, there are. On occasions when the commander  
20 in chief was absent or when he had met with some acci-  
21 dent, the Chief of Staff on occasion did decide matters  
22 which were urgent, matters which were relatively unim-  
23 portant, or matters of practice.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: on occasions  
25 when the commander in chief was absent or had something

else to do.

Q In such a case were any documents issued under the name of the commander in chief but without his knowledge?

A It was the practice, of course, to report decisions so made to the commander in chief. However, depending on the personal character of the Chief of Staff or on the contents of the decisions themselves, there were cases when the Chief of Staff arrived at a decision independently and did not report on it to the commander in chief.

MR. SASAGAWA: That ends my additional questions. You may cross-examine.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Mornane.

COLONEL MORNANE: May the witness be shown exhibit 1975?

(Whereupon a paper was handed to the witness.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY COLONEL MORNANE:

Q Witness, that is the document to which you refer in your evidence, is it not?

A Yes.

Q And that was sent by you to the vice minister of war on the 13th of August, 1942?

1           A    This is a report which was sent to the vice  
2 minister on the 13th of October.

3           COLONEL MORNANE:  If the Tribunal pleases, I  
4 would ask that this matter be referred to the Language  
5 Arbitrator.  I think that the witness' description of it  
6 is correct and that the exhibit itself is wrong in using  
7 August for October.

8           THE PRESIDENT:  It is referred accordingly.

9           Q    Now, you are familiar with this document, Wit-  
10 ness?

11          A    Yes.

12          Q    The first part deals with the arrival of prison-  
13 ers of war in Korea?

14          A    Yes.

15          Q    And the second paragraph reads as follows.

16          A    I am reading from the top of page 2 of the English:

17                "Worthy of special mention is the fact that the  
18 Koreans clearly recognized the fact that they are direct-  
19 ly participating in the Greater East Asia War when they  
20 saw the Korean guards.  As a whole, it seems that the  
21 idea was very successful in driving all admiration for  
22 the British and Americans out of their minds and in driv-  
23 ing into them an understanding of the situation."

24                That appears in that report?

25          A    Yes.

1 COLONEL MORNANE: Leaving that document for  
2 the moment, may the witness be shown exhibit 1973?

3 ("Thereupon a document was handed  
4 to the witness.)

5 Q Now, if you have a look at that exhibit, at  
6 a message from the accused ITAGAKI to the accused TOJO,  
7 it bears the date of the 23rd of March, 1942, does it  
8 not?

9 A Yes, March 23.

10 Q In that same document, under the heading "Plans  
11 of the Korean Army for the Internment of Prisoners of  
12 War: 1. Purpose: It is our purpose by interning Ameri-  
13 can and British prisoners of war in Korea, to make the  
14 Koreans realize positively the true might of our Empire  
15 as well as to contribute to psychological propaganda  
16 work for stamping out any ideas of worship of Europe and  
17 America which the greater part of Korea still retains at  
18 bottom" --

19 Now, witness, although that report was written  
20 before your time, you made yourself familiar with it be-  
21 fore writing the report exhibit 1975?

22 A Yes, I had read it -- looked through it.  
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1 Q And looking at the first page of the same  
2 document, secret telegram dated the 1st of March,  
3 1942 from the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army to  
4 the Vice-Minister of War, the first paragraph of that  
5 reads, "As it would be very effective in stamping out  
6 the respect and admiration of the Korean people for  
7 Britain and America, and also in establishing in them  
8 a strong faith in victory, and as the Governor-General  
9 and the Army are both strongly desirous of it, we  
10 wish you would intern 1,000 British and 1,000 Ameri-  
11 can prisoners of war in Korea. We wish you would  
12 give us special consideration regarding this matter."  
13 You also saw that document at that time.

14 A I believe I did.

15 Q Well, then, I suggest to you that when you  
16 received the reports mentioned in exhibit 1975 you  
17 drew them to the attention of your commanding officer,  
18 the accused ITAGAKI.

19 A May I have 1975?

20 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
21 to the witness.)

22 A (Continuing) I am sorry; may I have the  
23 question repeated, please?

24 (Whereupon, the last question  
25 was read by the Japanese court reporter.)

1 A (Continuing) May I ask you again, the docu-  
2 ment I have received is 1979, not 1975

3 COLONEL MORNANE: 1975 is should be, 1975.  
4 The witness says he has received 1979, not 1975.

5 Q Was that the first document to which I re-  
6 ferred you, witness?

7 A Is the title of that "Recollections Among  
8 the General Public Following Internment of British  
9 POW's"?

10 Q That is right.

11 A I am afraid I do not recollection whether or  
12 not I showed this report to the commander-in-chief.

13 Q You knew from previous correspondence the  
14 very purpose for which he wanted prisoners of war  
15 sent to Korea was shown to have been partially  
16 achieved in these reports.

17 A This report, as I have stated in my affi-  
18 davit, is a compilation of the reactions of the  
19 general public towards the prisoners of war taken in  
20 Malaya and elsewhere and interned. We did not write  
21 this report necessarily with the -- we did not compile  
22 this report calling attention to the purport given  
23 in the first part of the previous document.

24 Q Witness, your usual practice is to have the  
25 approval of the commander-in-chief when you send a

1 document like this or subsequently to refer it to  
2 him, is it not?

3 A Yes, as you say.

4 Q Have you any reason to doubt that you fol-  
5 lowed the usual practice in this case?

6 A I have no exact recollection.

7 Q And you have no reason to doubt that you  
8 followed your usual practice.

9 A No.

10 Q Now, referring to the document 1973 where  
11 it was stated the Governor-General and the Army are  
12 both strongly desirous of having the prisoners in  
13 Korea, did you take any steps to bring before the  
14 Governor-General the reactions of the people to the  
15 arrival of these prisoners?

16 A No, we didn't.

17 Q Why didn't you?

18 A Because it was not our duty to report to  
19 the Government-General.

20 Q But in a telegram sent by your predecessor  
21 you have stated to the Vice-Minister of War that the  
22 Governor-General is very desirous that prisoners  
23 should be taken to Korea.

24 A Since, when I assumed my post, my predeces-  
25 sor did not tell me anything in regard to this tele-

1 gram, I do not know just who in the Government-  
2 General was interested in obtaining this information.

3 Q Now, with regard to the arrival --

4 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, on the  
5 document that was just quoted, 1973, the word  
6 "Governor-General" appears in there instead of  
7 "Government-General." That had been previously cor-  
8 rected, and I think the record should be corrected  
9 this morning. When it was first used, it was used  
10 as "Governor-General," and right here at the present  
11 time he was calling it "Government-General," which  
12 does not specifically mean one individual. The  
13 translation is wrong. It is just the reverse of what  
14 was said. The Governor-General is named in that  
15 document when the word should be "Government-General,"  
16 and I think that the Language section can bear me out  
17 on that. I don't recall the previous question --

18 THE PRESIDENT: We have already been aware  
19 of that; but this is a communication from Korea to  
20 Japan, is it not?

21 COLONEL MORNANE: That is right.

22 THE PRESIDENT: And if a Governor-General  
23 didn't know about it, it is remarkable. We do not  
24 want a long debate on this.  
25

1 BY COLONEL MORNANE (Continued):

2 Q Witness, the prisoners of war, when they  
3 first arrived at Korea, were disembarked at Fusan,  
4 were they not --

5 A Yes.

6 Q (Continuing) and went by train to Keijo  
7 and other places?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And some of these reports you have got are  
10 as to what has happened in Fusan.

11 A Yes.

12 COLONEL MORNANE: That concludes the cross-  
13 examination, if the Tribunal please.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. SASAGAWA.

15 MR. SASAGAWA: I wish to redirect. Please  
16 show the witness document 1975.

17 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
18 to the witness.)

19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

20 BY MR. SASAGAWA:

21 Q Can you tell on that document any sign or  
22 chop or seal of any sort indicating that ITAGAKI had  
23 seen it?

24 A The document you have just shown me is the  
25 document as received in Tokyo at the War Ministry,

1 and there is no sign in it that General ITAGAKI saw  
2 it.

3 Q Then it will be the same in the case of  
4 1973.

5 A Yes.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We do not want him to tell  
7 us what is on the face of the document. We have  
8 eyes and we can read. You can use that in summation.

9 Q Mr. IHARA, what do you think this kind of  
10 reports? Are these documents very important documents  
11 which requires commandant's perusal or that he has to  
12 look into that later on?

13 A In the circumstances then prevailing, this  
14 was a secondary matter.

15 MR. SASAGAWA: That ends my examination.  
16 May the witness be excused?

17 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused accordingly.

18 (Whereupon, the witness was ex-  
19 cused.)

20 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Kraft.

21 LANGUAGE ARBITER (Captain Kraft): If you  
22 please, with the Court's permission, the Language  
23 Arbitration Board wishes to make the following cor-  
24 rections on document 650A, exhibit No. 1975: On the  
25 first page, lines 3, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 15 should read

1 "October" instead of "August."

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. SASAGAWA.

3 MR. SASAGAWA: Next I wish to offer in evi-  
4 dence defense document No. 2638, a report of inves-  
5 tigation on prisoner of war camps in Korea which  
6 was prepared by the representatives of the Red Cross.  
7 It relates to the inspection made in 1942.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2638  
10 will receive exhibit No. 3308.

11 (Whereupon, the document above  
12 referred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
13 3308 and received in evidence.)  
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1 MR. SASAGAWA: I read defense exhibit 3308:

2 "From: Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.

3 "To: The Chief of P.O.W. Information Bureau.

4 "Re: Forwarding a Translation of the Report  
5 on Visits to Korean P.O.W. Camps.

6 "As I received a copy of the report of Para-  
7 viccini, representative of the International Red Cross  
8 Committee stationed in Japan on his visits to Korean  
9 P.O.W. Camps (Seoul and Jinsen) and Civil Internment  
10 Camps, which was telegraphed to the Committee at  
11 Geneva in December last year, herewith I forward for  
12 your reference attached translation of same.

13 "Addressee of this document: War, Navy, In-  
14 terior, Great East Asia, each Vice-Ministers, Chief  
15 of P.O.W. Information Bureau, the President of Japan  
16 Red Cross.

17 "The translation of the telegram sent by the  
18 representative of the International Red Cross Com-  
19 mittee stationed in Japan to the International Red  
20 Cross Committee at Geneva on 26th December 1942.  
21 (Original in French).

22 "Report on visits to the P.O.W. Camps at  
23 Seoul and Jinsen and the Civil International Camp at  
24 Koshu)  
25

"No. 207.

1 "1. P.O.W. Camp-headquarters at Seoul.

2 "Address: P.O.W. Camp at Seoul, Korea.

3 "Time of visit: 18th December 1942.

4 "Time when Camp opened: 25th September 1942.

5 "Present force: 433. Capacity 500.

6 "Detail of present personnel: English 366,  
7 Australians 67, of which Officers 59.

8 "Former Camp: Singapore.

9 "Age: Oldest 58, Youngest 19, Average 28 Yrs.

10 (Average of Seoul and Jinsen Camps)"

11 I am sorry. I call to the Court's attention  
12 that the pages are wrongly inserted. Page 4 should  
13 follow this one.

14 "Just before visit 100 sent to Mukden and  
15 11 died.

16 "The Camp is situated at south-west of Seoul  
17 (Population 1,200,000) on dry clay-sandy soil. 30  
18 meters to Sea, healthy spot surrounded by woody hills,  
19 not affected by north wind.

20 "Area: 518 square meters, enclosed by wooden  
21 planks.

22 "Buildings: 2920 square meters, of which 1944  
23 sq.m. is a former spinning factory with four stories  
24 and here P.O.W. are billeted.

25 "Each can accommodate 36 persons.

1 "Air and light are sufficient.

2 "The floor is matted by Tatami, bed (Blanket)  
3 5, pillow, pillow cover.

4 "The rooms are lighted by electricity.

5 "Iron stoves burnt morning and night.

6 "The temperature at the time of visit was 16.

7 "There are common wash places equipped with  
8 water pipe and wooden tanks.

9 "In other building there is a large Japanese  
10 style bath tub for five persons.

11 "There are ordinary Japanese style lavatories  
12 24. The night soil is taken out at other part.

13 "There is sewerage.

14 "Water is good and suitable for drinks.

15 "There are five P.O.W. cooks.

16 "Ration per day: --"

17 And going back to page 3:

18 "Rice 378-379 gram, Rye 119 g., bread 281 g.,  
19 Meat 35-38 g., Fresh fish 27-60 g., salt 3-7 g.,  
20 Vegetable 604 g., Flour 19-26 g., bean soup 66-78 g.,  
21 Syouyu 15-35 g., Sugar 7-11 g., oil 15-17 g., Tomato  
22 Sauce 2 g. Calories 3251-3383.

23 "Average weight 61 kg. In comparison with  
24 the last month the average increase in weight in both  
25 camps is 408 g., and decrease 210 g.

1           "Canteen sells tobacco, a few toilet  
2 articles.

3           "Tobacco, soap, handkerchief, towel, tooth  
4 brush, tooth powder, razor, paper, a few pencils are  
5 given out free.

6           "The clothings which the P. O. W. possess  
7 are of summer use. The Japanese Government has sup-  
8 plied them with coats, winter underwears, socks, shoes.  
9 There is a shortage of underwears. On this point the  
10 Japanese troops at home are in the same condition.

11           "One Japanese doctor and three P.O.W. doctors  
12 are on duty usually.

13           "Serious cases are sent to the military  
14 hospital.

15           "Isolation ward, ordinary ward, pharmacy  
16 and dispensary are in good condition.

17           "Diphtheria 2, acute enteritis 7, cold 1,  
18 beriberi 1, malaria 1, acute bronchitis 2, abscess in  
19 rectum 1, amoeba dysentery 1, abscess in thigh 1, ton-  
20 silitis 3, periostitis 1, scaling of skin 1, tooth-  
21 ache 5, slight wounds 3.

22           "Total of patients 30, of which 2 sent to  
23 hospital. 11 are in Camp ward, 9 resting, 8 taking  
24 exercise.

25           "Bath is taken twice a week.

1 "The play ground is 900 square meters, They  
2 play hand ball.

3 "There is a small library of English books.

4 "There is an English daily newspaper sent by  
5 the Commandant.

6 "Sunday service is held. The pastors are the  
7 padres among P.O.W.

8 "Their money is deposited at a saving bank  
9 with the permission of the Commandant.

10 "Works are left to the choice of the prisoners.  
11 They work at cultivation, repairing of roads, trans-  
12 portation, packing."

13 Now going back to page 5:

14 "Their pay per day is 10 to 37 sens.

15 "Letters are allowed to be sent in one year  
16 by officers 6, concommisioned officers 4 or 5, sol-  
17 diers 3.

18 "No letter arived yet.

19 "No visiting or going out.

20 "Get up at 7 a.m. Light out at 21 o'clock.

21 "The relations with the Commander are good  
22 and their conduct are fair.

23 "Their requests are for news from home, supply  
24 of underwears, increase in Canteen goods.

25 "2. P.O.W.Camp Jinsen Branch.

1 "Address: P.O.W.Camps, Jinsen.  
2 "Date of visit: 14 December 1942.  
3 "Time when camp opened: 25th September 1942.  
4 "Number of the present force: English 462,  
5 Australians 18, Canadian 1, Portugese 1.  
6 "Former camp: Singapore Island.  
7 "Camp is situated at 35 k. meters south-  
8 west of Seoul, along the road to Jinsen Harbour (Popu-  
9 lation 100,000), 5 meters from Sea and is a healthy  
10 spot.  
11 "Highest temperature is 25, lowest temperature  
12 4 below zero. Average temperature 11: 1 higher than  
13 Seoul.  
14 "Rainfall - highest being 277 m.m. lowest  
15 20 m.m. Annual rainfall 1031.  
16 "Humidity - highest 85; lowest 65; average 72.  
17 "Total area: 16,090 sq.m.  
18 "Building: 8,277 sq.m., of which 6,354 sq.m.  
19 are used for P.O.W.  
20 "Built in 1941, Army model barracks 5.  
21 "The floor is matted by Tatami.  
22 "Russian style brick stoves.  
23 "Washing stands for 5 persons at a time.  
24 "There are water pipe installations.  
25 "Japanese doctor 1, P.O.W. doctor 2 are on duty.

1 "1/4 of site is used for play ground, a part  
2 of which is a vegetable garden.

3 "Diphtheria 18, acute enteritis 10, beriberi  
4 24, acute catarrh of the stomach 1, wounds 2, rectum 2,  
5 neuritis 1.

6 "Total patients 58, of which 27 are in camp  
7 hospital, 26 resting, 5 are working.

8 "The officers want to be separated farther  
9 from soldiers as collective living disturbs discipline.

10 "P.O.W. dentists require dental instruments.

11 "The Commandant of the both camps, Colonel  
12 NOGUCHI, is very kind and looked up as a benevolent  
13 father.

14 "In other details they are similar to the  
15 Camp at Seoul.

16 "3. Civil Internment Camp.

17 "Address: Koshu.

18 "Time of visit: 20 December 1942.

19 "Time when the camp was opened: Immediately  
20 after the outbreak of the war.

21 "American engineer 1, Dutch priest 1, Canadian  
22 missionary 4.

23 "Ages: 31-48 Yrs.

24 "Situated at 35 k.m. west of Taiden Railway  
25 station on the Central line. On the top of a small

1 hill near a Korean village with 10,000 population.

2 "The building is an American mission house,  
3 two stories, sunlit well aired building. Surrounded  
4 by woody hills.

5 "The soil is fertile and the climate is good.

6 "New style heating apparatus.

7 "In each room there are two beds.

8 "The interneers cook themselves and make  
9 bread too.

10 "In the yard there is a vegetable garden.

11 "There are plenty of food stuffs.

12 "They are allowed to buy things, but 3 men  
13 have no money.

14 "Plenty of clothing.

15 "There is no restriction on correspondence;  
16 radio will be installed in future.

17 "All interneers are healthy.

18 "There is a hospital next door.

19 "Get up at 5 and go to bed at 22 o'clock.

20 "Praying and services are done 6 hours a day.

21 "They want time for study and nothing else.

22 "Books and newspapers are provided.

23 "Treatment by the Government officials is good.

24 "Relation between them is very good too.

25 "The officials in charge are cordial and they

1 are helping the Japanese Red Cross society generously.

2 "Paraviccini."

3 and the prisoners of war of the Korean War.

4 THE WITNESS: Submitted on the above facts.

5 THE CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense counsel.

6 will receive exhibit No. 3407.

7 (Whereupon, the defendant above

8 referred to was asked whether exhibit

9 No. 3407 was received in evidence.)

10 THE WITNESS: I received exhibit No. 3407.

11 The contents of which are as follows:

12 Partial list of names of the International

13 Commission of the International Red Cross Society, and

14 Representatives of Prisoners of War.

15 The list is the work of the Main Camp Commis-

16 sion of the War Prisoners Internment Camp of Korea.

17 The list was dated 21 11 44, on November 11,

18 1944 (Exhibit 18).

19 THE WITNESS: Representative of the Red Cross

20 Society, Mr. Max Paraviccini.

21 The list is the work of the Main Camp Commis-

22 sion of the War Prisoners Internment Camp of Korea.

23 The list was dated 21 11 44, on November 11,

24 1944 (Exhibit 18).

25 The list is the work of the Main Camp Commis-

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1 MR. SASAGAWA: Next I offer in evidence defense  
2 document 2639. This is a report of contents of conver-  
3 sation between the representatives of the Red Cross  
4 and the prisoners of war at the Korean POW Camp.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

6 THE CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document  
7 2639 will receive exhibit No. 3309.

8 (Whereupon, the document above  
9 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
10 No. 3309 and received in evidence.)

11 MR. SASAGAWA: I now read exhibit No. 3309:

12 "The Contents of Talks between Mr. Max  
13 Pestalozzi, Representative to Japan of the International  
14 Commission of the International Red Cross Society, and  
15 Representatives of Prisoners of War.

16 "Place: In the room of the Main Camp Comman-  
17 dant of the War Prisoners Internment Camp of Korea.

18 "Time and Date: At 11 A.M. on November 15,  
19 1943 (Showa 18).

20 "Attendants: Representative of the Red Cross  
21 Society, Mr. Max Pestalozzi;

22 "Representatives of Prisoners of  
23 War, Lieutenant Colonel Ellington (the Second Battalion  
24 Commander of the Royal Regiment); Lieutenant Colonel  
25 Cardew; Captain Pake and Captain Salipan.

1 "Others: Chief of the Medical Department,  
2 SHINDO; Staff Officer YOSHIDA; Captain SASAKI,  
3 MP Lieutenant OGAWA; Interpreter ODA; Main Camp  
4 Commandant NOGUCHI; The First Branch Camp Commandant,  
5 and other members of the Camp.

6 "(After everyone having introduced himself):

7 "Mr. Pestalozzi: As a representative of the  
8 Red Cross, Mr. Paraviccini visited here last year, and  
9 in the same capacity I have come here this year. As I  
10 shall ask you a few questions, will you answer them  
11 frankly? First, have you received comfort goods or  
12 relief supplies from the Red Cross Society?

13 "Lt. Col. Ellington: Yes, we are grateful to  
14 get a lot of comfort goods from your society. Up to  
15 now, each of us received six parcels of comfort goods.

16 "Mr. Pestalozzi: Is there any remainder of  
17 them?

18 "Lt. Col. Ellington: No, but we still have  
19 some canned relief supplies.

20 "(Thereupon Camp Commandant NOGUCHI explains  
21 of Red Cross comfort parcels and relief supplies.)

22 "Mr. Pestalozzi: Cargoes of parcels and sup-  
23 plies have recently arrived at Yokohama, so within  
24 a few months such things will reach here, too, I suppose.  
25 We wish to send you even a part of them for Christmas.

1 Is there anything you want specially as relief supplies  
2 -- for instance -- medicines, vitamins, clothing and  
3 so on?

4 "Lt. Col. Ellington: First of all we want  
5 food, and then warm clothing.

6 "Mr. Pestalozzi: Aren't you supplied with  
7 clothing by Japanese forces?

8 "Lt. Col. Ellington: We are supplied with  
9 ordinary clothing, but want woolen waistcoats and  
10 hoods (caps) for protection against the cold. Ten  
11 to twelve persons do not have these hoods (caps).  
12 We want woolen mufflers, too. We have sufficient  
13 shoes.

14 "(Hereupon Camp Commandant NOGUCHI explains  
15 about such articles.)

16 "We want slippers, too.

17 "Mr. Pestalozzi: How about recreations?

18 "Lt. Col. Ellington: We want chiefly mental  
19 amusement, namely, instructive or scientific books.  
20 Japanese people are kind enough to let us read various  
21 books. Especially the Y.M.C.A. kindly lends us many  
22 books, but they are mostly novels; so, if possible,  
23 we want scientific books as I have just said. Of  
24 course, we will pay the price. In spring, summer  
25 and autumn, we succeeded in managing an 'officers'

1 farm', headed by Lt. Col. Cardew. But as we can't  
2 till the soil in winter, we want carpenters' tools  
3 for officers. Whatever tools will do.

4 "Mr. Pestalozzi: Anything else?

5 "Lt. Col. Ellington: To other ranks cards  
6 were given by the Y.M.C.A., but they have become worn  
7 out. Officers are allowed to buy them.

8 "Mr. Pestalozzi: How about the condition  
9 of mail?

10 "Lt. Col. Ellington: Almost all British  
11 prisoners have received letters from home. Those who  
12 did not get any letter from their wives or children  
13 have been allowed with special consideration to write  
14 to their homes. For this they are thankful. Letters  
15 from India and Australia have not yet reached here.

16 "Mr. Pestalozzi: The exchange steamer has  
17 recently returned, so lots of mail matters have  
18 arrived, I suppose. Especially from India and  
19 Australia, too.

20 "Lt. Col. Ellington: An Australian Red Cross  
21 representative called Philips is in this camp. He is  
22 worried about his own qualification (position). Will  
23 you help him in some way?

24 "Mr. Pestalozzi: I have once heard about him,  
25 but I cannot tell you anything concrete just now. As

1 far as I know he is granted the rank of Captain. If so,  
2 he will be regarded as a service man.

3 "Captain Hague: That is so in peace time or  
4 during hostilities, but the question is different after  
5 he was taken prisoner.

6 "Mr. Pestalozzi: Anyhow, after I go back to  
7 Tokyo and investigate it again, I will inform you about  
8 it. Next, what is the general condition of this camp?

9 "Lt. Col. Ellington: We are being treated  
10 well. It is not flattery but Camp Commandant NOGUCHI  
11 is always looking after the needs of the prisoners of  
12 war, and is very just and upright. He is doing all he  
13 can for us. All prisoners respect him. Next I hope  
14 that on coming Christmas those prisoners sent out from  
15 here to various other places will be able to have  
16 spiritual rites.

17 "Camp Commandant NOGUCHI: I intend to have  
18 those who are in Korea hold such rites in each camp.  
19 I cannot tell you with accuracy whether those who were  
20 transferred to Japan proper can do so, but I suppose  
21 they will probably have similar events.

22 "Lt. Col. Cardew: Here are two officers who  
23 are more than fifty years old. Myself and Captain  
24 Gelderd. Let me know whether or not you have any plan  
25 for transferring those persons to a special camp where

1 climate is mild and living conditions are better?

2 "Mr. Pestalozzi: I cannot give a concrete  
3 explanation, but so far as I know, we have not. How-  
4 ever, I will inform you of it after I return to  
5 Tokyo and investigate.

6 "Camp Commander NOGUCHI: We are giving special  
7 protection to them by supplying them with additional  
8 blankets. The Contents of Talks between Pestalozzi  
9 and Philips (Australian Red Cross Representative)  
10 during the former's visit:

11 "Mr. Pestalozzi: I have already heard of you.  
12 If there is anything I can do for you, I will inform  
13 you of it.

14 "Philips: Thank you. We are being treated  
15 well, but if I am likely to be allowed to go home,  
16 help me so.

17 "Mr. Pestalozzi: What is your health condition?

18 "Philips: Very well, but I am worried because  
19 I have not heard from home.

20 "Mr. Pestalozzi: I am sure you will hear  
21 before long.

22 "The Contents of Talks between Pestalozzi  
23 and Captain Faucet.

24 "Captain Faucet: I am also very much concerned  
25 about letters.

1 "Mr. Pestalozzi: Don't worry yourself for you  
2 will have them by Christmas, I suppose.

3 "Captain Faucet: Thank you."

4 Next I offer in evidence defense document 2640.  
5 This is a report of investigation on Prisoner of War  
6 Camps in Korea by the representatives of the Red Cross  
7 in the year 1944.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 THE CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document  
10 2640 will receive exhibit No. 3310.

11 (Whereupon, the document above  
12 referred to was marked defense exhibit (C  
13 No. 3310 and received in evidence.)

14 MR. SASAGAWA: I now read exhibit No. 3310.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Not all of it, surely?

16 MR. SASAGAWA: Yes, your Honor. The point is  
17 very difficult to take off which portion not to read.

18 THE PRESIDENT: According to the document,  
19 the report was made four years before the visits it  
20 records, and in the other documents, particularly  
21 3308, there is some peculiar statement about temperature  
22 in the area of buildings.

23 They require some supervision. They may be  
24 capable of explanation, but explanation about the date,  
25 of course, is difficult to give.

1           Are you going to read it all? I don't think  
2 it is necessary, really.

3           MR. SASAGAWA: I call the Tribunal's atten-  
4 tion that 1940 is wrong. The Japanese original  
5 states 1945.

6           In that case, I will --

7           THE PRESIDENT: If there is anything particu-  
8 larly favorable, you might read it, but the rest of  
9 it seems to be quite ordinary.

10          MR. SASAGAWA: I would like to read the  
11 portions about the buildings and food rations.

12          THE PRESIDENT: Look through it during the  
13 recess, Mr. Sasagawa.

14          We will recess for fifteen minutes.

15                 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
16 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings  
17 were resumed as follows:)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. SASAGAWA.

4 MR. SASAGAWA: If the Tribunal pleases, I  
5 limit it to about two pages full of the document to be  
6 read. Page 1 -- rather wrongly numbered, but page 1;  
7 you have it, sir -- the third line from the bottom:

8 "There is sufficient light by electricity.  
9 Large rooms are warmed by Pechika and small rooms are  
10 warmed by coal-burning stoves.

11 "The 1st barrack accommodates 22 persons with  
12 an air capacity of 884 cubic metres.

13 "The second barrack accommodates 78 persons  
14 with an air capacity of 1773 cubic metres.

15 "Ventilation and Sewerage: Good.

16 "Beat-and-sweep cleaning: Done twice a week.

17 "Air raid shelter: Capable of admitting 350  
18 persons.

19 "Interpreter: 2.

20 "Privy compartment: 34 (Japanese style).

21 "Lavatory: 8.

22 "Boiler for bath: 8.

23 "Wash basin: 45.

24 "Faucet: 8.

25 "Ration (unit: gram).

1 "Medium: flour, 15; soyabean powder, 3;  
2 polished oat (mixed with rice), 87 to officer, 94 to  
3 the rest; soyabean, 30; meat or pork, 20; fresh fish  
4 or frozen fish, 50; dried fish, 5;

5 "Eggs are provided for patients and weak  
6 persons in accordance with requirements, and milk is  
7 the same.

8 "Bean juice, 200; soybean oil, 10; vegetable,  
9 500; dried vegetable, 100; potato, 138; apple, 3 to an  
10 officer every week since October, and 2 to the rest.  
11 Fruits of other kinds are provided in due season.

12 "Gake, occasionally; curry powder, pepper, red  
13 pepper, soybean sauce, sauce and vinegar, 113 in all;  
14 green tea, 5; black tea, 2 to an officer.

15 "Additional provisions: For a prisoner of war  
16 who is engaged in labor outside the internment camp  
17 ground, 90 grams of rice and 30 grams of oat are pro-  
18 vided. For a prisoner of war working within the ground,  
19 60 grams of rice and 30 grams of oat are provided.

20 "The prisoner of war acquires average 3200  
21 calories.

22 "Members of dispensary: 1 officer and 3 soldiers  
23 on duty on the part of the Japanese, and 1 officer and  
24 3 soldiers on duty on the part of the prisoners.

25 "Medical treatment house: facing to the south,

1 sunny, capable of admitting 20 persons (but including  
2 an isolation ward which can keep 7 patients) and said  
3 to be completely equipped with medical facilities.  
4 However, as there are no X-ray facilities, patients who  
5 need those facilities are to be sent to a local hospital.  
6 Equipped with facilities for small surgical operations  
7 and with three sterilizers.

8 "Medical attention: Once a day.

9 "Dental attention: Given once a week by a  
10 Japanese dentist belonging to the headquarter of the  
11 internment camp."

12 I skip to page 6, beginning with the fourth  
13 line.

14 "Playground: 1250 square meters.

15 "Vegetable garden: 4860 square meters (outside  
16 the compound), 2916 square meters (within the compound).  
17

18 "2 pigs, 23 rabbits: the increase of pigs is  
19 being planned."

20 That is the end of my reading.

21 Next, I call the witness HAZEYAMA, Tetsuo,  
22 whose affidavit is defense document No. 2040.

23 - - -  
24  
25

1 T E T S U O H A Z E Y A M A, called as a witness on  
2 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,  
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as follows:

4 DIRECT EXAMINATION

5 BY MR. SASAGAWA:

6 Q Will you, Mr. HAZEYAMA, state your name and  
7 address?

8 A My name is HAZEYAMA, Tetsuo; my address, care of  
9 Depot Affairs Bureau, Onaka-Dai, Chiba City.

10 MR. SASAGAWA: Please show to the witness  
11 defense document No. 2040.

12 Q Is that your affidavit, Mr. HAZEYAMA?

13 A Yes.

14 Q Are the contents true and correct?

15 A Yes.

16 MR. SASAGAWA: I offer defense document 2040.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 2040  
19 will receive exhibit No. 3311.  
20

21 (Whereupon, the document above  
22 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
23 No. 3311 and received in evidence.)

24 MR. SASAGAWA: I shall read exhibit No. 3311.  
25 I skip the formal part; I start with No. 1.

"1. I was a staff officer of the 1st section

1 (mainly responsible for giving the operation and training)  
2 of the 7th Area Army, from January 29, 1945 to the day  
3 of Japan's surrender.

4 "I was a major at the time of Japan's surrender.  
5 At present I live in the Depot Affairs Bureau at Onaka-  
6 Dai, Chiba City.

7 "2. The Commander of the 7th Area Army was  
8 General DOHIHARA, Kenji, until April 21, 1945 and  
9 General ITAGAKI, Seishiro, from that time to the sur-  
10 render.

11 "3. General ITAGAKI was formally appointed as  
12 commander of the area army on April 7, 1945, but as  
13 his trip took some days, he took over the duties, as  
14 I remember, on 21 April.

15 "4. The units which were under the Commander  
16 of the 7th Area Army were, in the main, as follows:  
17 16th Army, 25th Army, 29th Army, 37th Army (as of mid-  
18 night, May 19, 1945).

19 "Directly attached units: 40th Division,  
20 Defense Unit for Shonan" -- that is Singapore - "26th  
21 Independent Mixed Brigade, 13th Independent Artillery  
22 Regiment, 43rd Independent Engineer Regiment, other  
23 small non-combatant units.

24 "The defense area for each of the above armies  
25 was, in the main, as follows: 16th Army Java, 25th Army

Sumatra, 29th Army Malay Peninsula, 37th Army Borneo.

"Areas under direct jurisdiction: Singapore Island (after June 1945 Singapore Province was included).

"There were some stationed air units and communication units in the defense area of the 7th Area Army, but these units came directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army. These units received instructions from the commander of the area army only with regard to their ground fighting.

"The same was true with the naval units.

"4. The chain of command regarding the units concerned with POWs was as follows:

"POW camps were under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, and the local army commander (if the area came directly under an area army, the commander of such an area army) had control over them in limited matters.

"The scope of the authority of army commander, as set forth in the regulation, was limited to supply of provisions and articles, guard duties, etc.

"The system of administration of POWs was set forth by the POWs Administration Bureau in Japan and by the Southern Army.

"5. The use of POWs for labor was done in the following manner:

1           A) POWs were used within the limits fixed by  
2 the 'Regulations Concerning POW's Labor' and the  
3 "Regulations Concerning the Dispatch of POWs." In  
4 using POWs for labor the chiefs of POW camps were con-  
5 sulted regarding the condition of POWs and the number  
6 of POWs available so as to meet the labor conditions.

7           "B) In Singapore, POWs were used in  
8 construction works. They were healthy prisoners, and  
9 they were never used in works directly concerned with  
10 fighting.

11           "Moreover with a suggestion of General ITAGAKI  
12 to accord better treatment to these prisoners the amount  
13 of their food was increased to the level of that given  
14 to the Japanese soldiers.

15           "6. The condition of communication in the  
16 South and the food condition in the vicinity of Singapore  
17 after April, 1945, were roughly as follows:

18           "A) Communications between Japan proper and  
19 Singapore.

20           "Communications by sea were completely cut off.  
21 Only a small number of persons made trips by plane.  
22 There was no chance to supply munitions from Japan  
23 proper.

24           "B) Communications between Singapore and other  
25 places in the South Seas.

1 "a) Singapore area maintained 15,000 tons  
2 of ships which were usable. The majority of these  
3 ships were used between Singapore and Java and Singapore  
4 and Palembang. But these ships could not effectively  
5 meet the transportation demand, due to the enemy's  
6 interference.

7 "b) Planes were only used for transporting  
8 a small number of persons in areas free from the attack  
9 of enemy.

10 "c) Singapore-Java.

11 "Goods transported amounted to 10,000 tons  
12 per month. Of this 5,000 tons were rice, and the  
13 remainder included arms and munitions and troops trans-  
14 ferred from areas north of Australia. However, with  
15 the increasing difficulty of using larger ships, it was  
16 planned to use sailboats with motors and warships in  
17 order to utilize the land transportation facilities on  
18 Sumatra. These proved to be inadequate in counter-  
19 acting the transportation shortcomings.

20 "d) Singapore-Palembang (Sumatra).

21 "Goods transported amounted to 5,000-6,000 tons  
22 per month. These were mainly fuel and materials. As  
23 for food, little amount could be transported from Sumatra,  
24 because Sumatra itself was short of food.  
25

1 "e) Singapore-Borneo.

2 "As the areas near Borneo were always under  
3 the control of the Allied planes, the use of large  
4 ships for transportation was impossible. After April  
5 we tried several sailboats with motors. Among them,  
6 only one boat named 'Borneo-maru' was successful as  
7 I recall. After June, even these sailboats with motors  
8 were unusable. Then we transferred one company of  
9 landing boats (about 20 boats) from Java. But these  
10 boats also proved to be incapable of transportation.  
11 The first boat reached Pontianak just before the time  
12 of Japan's surrender. The sailboats with motors that  
13 were in Borneo ports were all out of order. None of  
14 them reached Singapore. Such being the case, most of  
15 the goods for Borneo were stored at Singapore.

16 "f) Singapore-French Indo-China.

17 "Sailboats with motors were used in transport-  
18 ing rice between these places. But due to motor trou-  
19 bles and the enemy's interference, rice transported was  
20 only 1,000 tons per month.

21 "g) Singapore-Siam.

22 "Transportation chiefly of rice was carried out  
23 by junks and railways. But like in the above cases, it  
24 was not effective, the amount of transportation per  
25 month being 3,000 tons.

1 "h) Singapore-Burma.

2 "After about April 1944, sea communications  
3 were cut off. And railways were damaged at many places.  
4 Transportation was practically unavailable.

5 "i) Singapore-Andaman and Nicobar.

6 "In about May or June, a convoy consisting  
7 of three or four ships was sent twice. But these  
8 ships were attacked by the Allied forces and practi-  
9 cally wiped out. Only one ship returned, as I remember.

10 "Communications by plane was attempted only a  
11 few times by naval planes.

12 "Consequently, the Japanese Army in the  
13 above islands suffered greatly from the acute shortage  
14 of food, but they had no means to correct the situation.

15 "C) Food conditions in the vicinity of Singa-  
16 pore.

17 "To feed the people and the troops stationed  
18 in Singapore at least 8,000 tons of rice were required  
19 per month. But, as stated above, the transportation  
20 of food to Singapore from other places gradually be-  
21 came so difficult that after July or so they could not  
22 depend on what was coming from other areas. So it  
23 was planned to save the rice they had in store as  
24 much as possible, and the rations for the people as  
25 well as for the troops were cut down to 2/3 of the

normal quantity from around March.

1 "In spite of the above measure, the quantity  
2 of rice in store for the civilians and soldiers at the  
3 time of Japan's surrender was not enough to last 6  
4 months.

5 "In order to make up for the deficit, a great  
6 effort was made to become self-sufficient, but due to  
7 the poor productivity of the area, this aim was not  
8 accomplished as much as we expected.

9 "The supplies for POW's inevitably decreased  
10 under the above circumstances but every effort was  
11 made to give substitutes to POW's who were also in-  
12 structed to alleviate the situation by raising vege-  
13 tables, etc. in the vicinity of their barracks.

14 "Medical supplies, too, were not sent from  
15 Japan proper. So efforts were made to produce such  
16 items locally and to save them, but refined, critical  
17 medicines were lacking.

18 "7. The 37th Army was commanded in the  
19 following manner:

20 "The above army came under the command of  
21 the 7th Area Army Commander on 20th May when the war  
22 situations at the Borneo fronts were increasingly be-  
23 coming difficult. Communications by air and sea be-  
24 tween Singapore and Borneo were almost cut off. Signal  
25

1 communications were also very difficult and wireless  
2 contact was barely maintained for about 30 minutes  
3 twice a day. This was due to the lack of fuel and  
4 electric source in Singapore. When a plane was dis-  
5 patched from Singapore, we were uncertain whether it  
6 could reach the objective. When the plane did reach  
7 the objective, its return was questionable because of  
8 fuel.

9 "One hour's signal communication a day was  
10 not enough even to send or receive urgent operational  
11 reports. The exchange of information being thus ex-  
12 tremely restricted, all we were able to learn about the  
13 Allied forces was their general situations and it was  
14 not an easy matter to find out what was going on in  
15 their rear areas.

16 "As the sole means to get a clear picture  
17 of this unknown condition in Borneo, Lieutenant Colonel  
18 NAITO Kiyoshi, a staff officer, was dispatched by plane  
19 to Borneo. The plane in which he flew got lost at  
20 sea on July 7th and never returned. Thus the condi-  
21 tion in Borneo was never made clear up to the time of  
22 Japan's surrender.

23 "As mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, it  
24 was virtually impossible to ship out materials. As  
25 a result what ammunitions and other war supplies we

1 were able to send to Borneo from Singapore consti-  
2 tuted only five or six per cent of the request re-  
3 peatedly made from Borneo.

4 "As we were in such a predicament as not  
5 being able to send even badly needed ammunitions for  
6 operational purposes, we never had an opportunity  
7 until the day of surrender to send the relief items  
8 for POW's which arrived in Singapore by the Awa-maru.

9 "(After Japan's surrender these relief items  
10 were handed over to the POW's in Singapore, with their  
11 understanding on the circumstances.)

12 "The condition of communications being as  
13 stated above, we had no alternative but to let the  
14 Commander of the 37th Army handle everything concern-  
15 ing his army. The transfer of the POW's in Borneo was  
16 planned by the above army before it came under the co-  
17 mand of the area army, and the area army was not in  
18 position to find out how it was carried out. And  
19 since the commander of the area army was not directly  
20 responsible for the handling of these POW's he had  
21 nothing to do in this connection."

22 You may cross-examine.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Mornane.  
24  
25

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY COLONEL MORNANE:

Q Witness, with regard to the command of the 29th Army at Malay Peninsula, in addition to Malay Peninsula, Adaman and Nicobar Islands were also under the command of that army, were they not?

A Yes.

Q Now, with regard to treatment of prisoners of war, you refer to the scope of the authority of the army commander being limited as set forth in some regulation. To what regulation do you refer?

A By that I meant the extent ordered by the general commander under POW regulations, ~~et cetera~~.

Q They are POW regulations made in Tokyo?

A Yes.

COLONEL MORNANE: I refer the Court to exhibit 1965, which contains those regulations, as we submit there is no such limitation.

Q Now, in addition to supply of provisions I take it the area army also had to supply medical supplies and provide for hospitalization of the sick.

A Yes, that was one of our duties also.

Q With regard to use of prisoner of war labor, the area army decided what laboring projects had to be done?

1           A    As regards the type of work that was de-  
2               cided after consultation with the general army --  
3               after consultation with the Commander of the Southern  
4               General Army.

5           Q    But the area army wouldn't consult the  
6               Southern Army Commander every time they wanted  
7               prisoners of war to be engaged in labor, would they?

8           A    That is correct. The details were decided  
9               by the area army, but in regard to general policy  
10              that was decided on by the general army.

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1 Q And the Area Army would decide how many men  
2 were required each day.

3 A Yes.

4 Q And they would request the chief of the  
5 prisoner of war camp to supply that number of men?

6 A Yes. On such occasions, as I stated in my  
7 affidavit, the condition of the -- the POW camp command  
8 would be asked to make a report on the condition of  
9 POW's and with that report as a basis the actual details  
10 were decided.

11 Q Well, now, your duties did not require you to  
12 take any interest in prisoner of war labor; did they?

13 A I do not think you can say I had nothing to do  
14 with prisoners of war. However, that was not my main  
15 duty.

16 Q And you cannot say that sick prisoners of war  
17 were never used for construction work?

18 A I was concerned with it to the extent that  
19 whenever strategy required, so many laborers would be  
20 sent to work at such and such a place.

21 Q But you would not supervise the operation of  
22 the work at all.

23 A No, I did not.

24 Q Yes. Now, although you say prisoners of war  
25 were not used in work directly concerned with fighting,

1 they were certainly used in building anti-aircraft  
2 defenses, were they not?

3 A They were used for constructing anti-aircraft  
4 shelters for noncombatants.

5 Q Were they not also used for constructing defense  
6 positions in July, when the Japanese Army feared that  
7 Singapore would be invaded?

8 A No, they were not.

9 Q Do you know the Bukittimah Rifle Range?  
10 THE MONITOR: Will you spell that out, please,  
11 Colonel.

12 COLONEL MORNANE: Yes. B-u-k-i-t-t-i-m-a-h.

13 A Yes, I do.

14 Q Were not prisoners of war from Outram Road  
15 Jail used there for constructing Japanese defensive  
16 positions?

17 A They were merely used for building anti-aircraft  
18 shelters.

19 Q Well, now, you say that in March of 1945 the  
20 ration for troops was cut down to two-thirds of the  
21 normal ration. What ration were they receiving prior  
22 to that?

23 A They were receiving 600 grammes of staple foods.

24 Q Now, what about prisoners of war; what were  
25 they receiving?

1 A At that time they were receiving 500 grammes.

2 Q And what did General ITAGAKI do about that?

3 A Do you mean when the ration was reduced?

4 Q No. You have referred to General ITAGAKI  
5 increasing the ration of prisoners of war.

6 A That was after General ITAGAKI assumed his  
7 post. In March he had not yet arrived.

8 Q When General ITAGAKI did come, prisoners of  
9 war were receiving 500 grammes of rice.

10 A At that time they were on reduced rations.

11 Q And that was 500 grammes?

12 A No, they were receiving about two-thirds of  
13 that amount.

14 Q About two-thirds of 500?

15 A Yes.

16 Q And for how long had they been receiving that?

17 A May I have that repeated, please?

18 (Whereupon, the last question was  
19 read by the Japanese court reporter.)  
20

21 A I recalled that it was about the end of -- I  
22 recall that it was around March when the rations were  
23 reduced and these reduced rations continued until the  
24 end of May.

25 Q Well, then, what did General ITAGAKI do at the  
end of May?

1           A    I don't exactly recall the date. However,  
2 General ITAGAKI conducted an inspection tour of POW  
3 camps, and finding out in detail about the conditions  
4 of supply in those camps, he ordered that the rations  
5 be increased.

6           Q    Increased to what?

7           A    For those going out for work he ordered that  
8 their rations be increased to be the same amount as that  
9 of the Japanese soldiers.

10          Q    What about the sick; what did they get?

11          A    I have forgotten the exact amount. However,  
12 in regard to those who were sick a special patients'  
13 rations were decided on and I believe that that supply  
14 was pretty good.

15          Q    Isn't it a fact that the sick only got two-  
16 thirds of the amount of the prisoners of war who went  
17 out to work get?

18          A    No, that is not so.

19          Q    What did the prisoners of war who didn't go  
20 out to work get?

21          A    For those who didn't go out to work and for  
22 those who were resting they received two-thirds.

23          Q    Well, now, did the working prisoners of war  
24 continue to receive 500 grammes of rice right up to  
25 the surrender?

1 A 400 grammes.

2 Q 400 grammes. That is, they --

3 A That is the same amount as that received by  
4 the Japanese Army.

5 THE MONITOR: Correction: Japanese soldiers.

6 Q Now, with regard to the -- at the surrender,  
7 at Kranji Camp were not large stocks of butter, powdered  
8 milk and other captured commodities sent in by the  
9 Japanese immediately on the Japanese surrender in  
10 August of '45?

11 THE PRESIDENT: He suggested six months supply.

12 Q That is --

13 A Where were these supplies sent from?

14 THE MONITOR: That was rice supplies.

15 COLONEL MORNANE: Let us say, your Honor, with  
16 regard to rice, what I am now referring to are commodities  
17 captured at the time of surrender of Singapore and held  
18 in stock all the time.

19 Q Will you answer the question, witness.

20 A May I have the question repeated?

21 (Whereupon, the last question was read  
22 by the Japanese court reporter.)

23 A From where were these supplies sent?

24 Q These were supplies that had been captured  
25 by the Japanese when they first took Singapore and

that had been stored there ever since.

1           A   What do you suggest that we did with those  
2 supplies?

3           Q   I suggest that from the 15th to the 22nd of  
4 August you opened your stores and you gave them to  
5 prisoners of war instead of giving them to them when  
6 they needed them throughout their captivity.

7           A   At the time of the surrender we were still  
8 prepared for a long war and therefore we had kept these  
9 supplies in reserve for a long and difficult period of  
10 fighting, so that even in the most stringent circum-  
11 stances we would still be able to give them a sufficient  
12 supply.

13           Q   And those supplies included medical supplies?

14           A   Yes, I believe that medical supplies were  
15 included.

16           Q   Well, now, with regard to the command of the  
17 37th Army, with regard to the area which it occupied,  
18 the 37th Army was responsible for the defense of the  
19 whole of Borneo, was it not?

20           A   In regard to Dutch Borneo it was responsible  
21 for land warfare on that island -- in that sector.

22           COLONEL MORNANE: That concludes the cross-  
23 examination, if your Honor please.

24           THE PRESIDENT: Mr. SASAGAWA.  
25

MR. SASAGAWA: No redirect, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want him any further?

MR. SASAGAWA: May the witness be released?

THE PRESIDENT: He is released on the usual  
terms.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

- - -

1 MR. SASAGAWA: Next, we offer in evidence the  
2 affidavit of the deponent -- of the witness AYABE,  
3 Kitsuki, defense document No. 1830.

4 He is now at Singapore. A subpoena has been  
5 issued to the proper authority to produce this witness,  
6 but so far we have not received any answer, and he has  
7 not been produced or appeared.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Any objection, Colonel Mornane?

9 COLONEL MORNANE: If the Tribunal pleases, I  
10 notice that this affidavit is sworn on the 6th of  
11 February, 1947, at the Changi Jail in Singapore.  
12 That certainly suggests something to me, and if the  
13 witness were here, I would certainly put a line of  
14 cross-examination as to his credit. I therefore --

15 THE PRESIDENT: Does it suggest to you that  
16 the British are holding him?

17 COLONEL MORNANE: I beg your pardon.

18 THE PRESIDENT: The British Commonwealth, I  
19 mean.

20 COLONEL MORNANE: With the lapse of time, it  
21 suggests he has been convicted of some crime. Whether  
22 he is held or is dead, I don't know. But, I think the  
23 Tribunal ought to be informed as to what the actual  
24 position is.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are apparently not

1 objecting to the affidavit.

2 COLONEL MORNANE: Except with regard to the  
3 last two paragraphs, paragraph 7 and paragraph 8. I  
4 submit that they are both so vague as to have no pro-  
5 bative value at all.

6 MR. SASAGAWA: We have no objection about  
7 deleting these two paragraphs.

8 COLONEL MORNANE: There is only one other  
9 matter. I would like the Tribunal's permission to  
10 bring whatever information I can get -- oh, well, I  
11 don't think it matters.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Well, the affidavit is admitted,  
13 except the last two questions and answers, on the usual  
14 terms.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No.  
16 1830 will receive exhibit No. 3312.

17 (Whereupon, the document above  
18 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
19 No. 3312 and received in evidence.)

20 MR. SASAGAWA: I read now exhibit No. 3312:  
21 "Sworn Deposition (Translation)

22 "Deponent: AYABE Kitsuju (Ex. Lieut.-Gen.)  
23 53 years of age.

24 "Having first duly sworn an oath as on  
25 attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure

followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1 "I. Outline of My Personal History.

2 "1. At the end of October, 1943, I arrived  
3 at Singapore from Tokyo to take up the post of Vice-  
4 Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the  
5 Southern Area Army (I took charge of affairs concern-  
6 ing operations.)

7 "The then Commander-in-Chief of the Army was  
8 Marshal TERAUCHI. (He was in Singapore from 1942  
9 until he moved to Manila in June, 1944.)

10 "2. In April, 1944, the Headquarters of the  
11 7th Area Army was newly formed at Singapore and the  
12 Malay, Java, and Sumatra areas were put under its  
13 command. General DOHIHARA came from Tokyo as Commander  
14 of the Army.

15 "At the same time I was attached to the 7th  
16 Area Army Headquarters. (Due to a fracture sustained  
17 on the right shin as a result of an air accident, I  
18 had been under medical treatment in hospital since  
19 February and not assuming my duties.)

20 "3. At the end of June, 1944, I was appointed  
21 Chief of Staff of the 7th Area Army and was on duty from  
22 1 July. At that time my wound had not yet recovered and  
23 I was not quite equal to any work which required bodily  
24 action.  
25

1 "4. In April, 1945, General DOHIHARA was  
2 transferred to a post in Tokyo. General ITAGAKI was  
3 appointed Commander of the Army and arrived at Singa-  
4 pore from Korea.

5 My duty remained the same up to the termin-  
6 ation of the War.

7 "II. Statement in Reply to Inquiries.

8 "1. Q. Did you have chances to inspect the  
9 condition of war-prisoner treatment and billet accomo-  
10 dations at the camp?

11 "A. About November, 1943 (I do not re-  
12 call the exact date) I had an opportunity to inspect  
13 the treatment of the war-prisoners and part of the  
14 camp accommodations at Changyi in Singapore. The  
15 billets I inspected were wooden barracks, but were  
16 clean and the compound looked comfortable, with  
17 flowers and vegetables growing in the surrounding area.  
18 According to the officials there, the prisoners were  
19 on the whole content with the treatment, though some  
20 were somewhat discontented with the food, which chief-  
21 ly consisted of rice. I was informed that there was  
22 no serious question in the way of treatment.

23 "Since I sustained an injury in February, 1944,  
24 I had no chance to inspect, due to my difficulty in  
25 walking."

1 If the Tribunal wishes this, the following  
2 portion is not so very relevant to ITAGAKI's case.  
3 May I skip that, sir?

4 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will rely on your  
5 judgment to omit anything not very useful.

6 MR. SASAGAWA: I wish to read from page 5,  
7 sir:

8 "About May, 1945, I recall, he inspected the  
9 war-prisoners' camp and the internment camp for  
10 civilians in Singapore in about May, 1945."

11 "He" here is ITAGAKI, himself.

12 "5. Q. Was the treatment of war-prisoners  
13 improved after Gen. ITAGAKI's arrival at his post as  
14 compared with the period prior to it?

15 "A. Gen. ITAGAKI is really a man of  
16 justice and a friend and champion of humanity. There-  
17 fore, he endeavored to give the best treatment possible  
18 to the war-prisoners and there was marked improvement,  
19 as explained in the following.

20 "1). At the time of Gen. ITAGAKI's arrival  
21 there at his post, the Japanese steamer Awa-Maru, with  
22 full cargo of relief goods for allied war-prisoners  
23 came to Saigon, Singapore, and Batavia from Japan. A  
24 large number of Japanese civilians unable to return  
25 home due to a tie-up then of sea transportation between

1 Japan and the Southern Areas were still there. With  
2 due permission, they sailed for Japan aboard the  
3 vessel. In spite of the guarantee made by the Allied  
4 Powers that the Awa-Maru would be perfectly safe, the  
5 vessel was attacked and sunk by an enemy submarine in  
6 the neighboring waters of Formosa. And when the sad  
7 report reached there that none of the members of the  
8 crew or of the passengers was saved (I remember they  
9 numbered two thousand and several hundred) the public  
10 opinion of the Japanese there was so much excited that  
11 many of them opined that under the circumstances dis-  
12 tribution of the said relief goods brought over by the  
13 Awa-Maru to the war-prisoners be suspended. Gen.  
14 ITAGAKI, however, attempted to allay the aroused public  
15 opinion, admonishing that 'the spirit of Japanese  
16 "Bushido" cannot permit such a thing. From the stand-  
17 point of justice and humanity, we should distribute  
18 the relief goods to them with pleasure even under  
19 these circumstances. You people must calmly display  
20 real spirit of Japanese "Bushido".' Thus he ordered  
21 the distribution of the relief goods without delay.  
22 I believe that the war-prisoners at that time must  
23 surely admit that this was realized.

24 "2). Since before the arrival of Gen.  
25 ITAGAKI, our land and sea transportation capacity in

1 the surrounding areas of the Malay Peninsula had been  
2 considerably reduced by the enemy's air and underwater  
3 attacks, and as a result towards January, 1945, the  
4 supply of rice from the Siam area had decreased to  
5 less than one-third of the total amount needed and  
6 ever since the supply was steadily on the decrease.

7 "Meanwhile, there was no other alternative  
8 but to decrease rations, because, on the one hand, our  
9 military strength in the Malay and Singapore areas had  
10 been gradually increased due to a change in operation  
11 plans, making the supply of provisions all the more  
12 difficult and, on the other hand, provisions had to be  
13 reserved in order to make preparations for the new  
14 operations. Namely, in the Japanese forces, the ration  
15 of rice as staple food per head a day which used to be  
16 700 grams was cut to 600 grams in February, 1945, and  
17 further to 500 grams in March of the same year. The  
18 rice ration for the war-prisoners and internees was  
19 200 grams less than that for the Japanese soldiers,  
20 but the want of rice was supplemented by potatoes  
21 rations which were obtained by self production on the  
22 spot, and thus, with the supplementary and additional  
23 supplies of potatoes, they were allowed to get the  
24 total quantity of 700 grams of rice and potatoes.  
25

"Furthermore, as to meat and vegetables,

1 besides their regular rations, the additional supply  
2 of these foods which were obtained by self supporting  
3 on the spot was granted to all of them. And in this  
4 way efforts were made to prevent the decline of their  
5 physical strength.

6 Gen. ITAGAKI gave special orders to his men  
7 to provide the war-prisoners, who engaged in the anti-  
8 air raid construction work since April, 1945, with the  
9 same staple food rations as given to the Japanese  
10 soldiers, and furthermore added not only 100 grams  
11 of corn or 250 grams of tapioca as substitutes for  
12 rice, but also such luxuries, though in small quant-  
13 ities, as coffee, sugar, milk, jam, oatmeal, etc.  
14 Under such circumstances, the war-prisoners were  
15 delighted to engage in this work. I heard that, when  
16 Gen. ITAGAKI visited the internment camp in May, 1945,  
17 he specially inspected the rations provisions of the  
18 internees and desired the men in charge to increase  
19 them as much as possible."  
20

21 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now until  
22 half past one.

23 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess  
24 was taken.)  
25 - - -

## AFTERNOON SESSION.

1  
2 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess,  
3  
4 at 1330.

5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's permis-  
8 sion, the accused OKA will be absent from the court-  
9 room for the whole of the afternoon session conferring  
10 with his counsel.

11 MR. SASAGAWA: I continue reading:

12 "3) In regard to labor, it was also unavoid-  
13 able to make the war prisoners work, when as mentioned  
14 before, the Japanese soldiers were all engaged in  
15 labor and even the Japanese civilians were rendering  
16 labor service. But the labor, since General ITAGAKI's  
17 arrival, was chiefly limited to the afore-mentioned  
18 anti-airraid constructions work, and, those who en-  
19 gaged in labor and their supervising officers as well  
20 were only chosen men who were specially healthy. Most  
21 of them lived and worked together with the Japanese  
22 soldiers. And in regard to the supply of food and  
23 other rations, they were given the same treatment as  
24 the Japanese soldiers. Such being the case, the treat-  
25 ment was much improved, as compared with the previous

period.

1           "4). In respect to sanitation also, any  
2 medical supplies or medicine which the Japanese Army  
3 possessed, except the special articles which were not  
4 in the possession of the Japanese, was given them  
5 immediately in compliance with their requests. No  
6 discrimination was made because they were war prisoners.  
7 Especially, the war prisoners who engaged in the above-  
8 mentioned work were allowed to undergo medical treat-  
9 ment by Japanese medical officers like the Japanese  
10 soldiers. So there was no case of airing their griev-  
11 ances at that time.  
12

13           "From the above, it may be seen that it was  
14 unavoidable from the standpoint of the general condi-  
15 tions at that time, that in the treatment of war pri-  
16 soners, especially rations had to be gradually de-  
17 creased. These rations were uniformly reduced among  
18 the Japanese Army forces too. But special consideration  
19 was given to those who were engaged in labor in provid-  
20 ing them with increased rations, which were the same as  
21 given to the Japanese soldiers, and also in adding to  
22 these rations other luxuries. It is a fact that an  
23 improvement, though in part, was achieved in the treat-  
24 ment of war prisoners. All this, I believe, serves to  
25 show General ITAGAKI's leadership based on his respect

of humanity.

1 "Q How were the natives treated by the Japanese  
2 forces at that time?

3 "A General DOHIHARA, Commander of the 7th-Area  
4 Army, and his successor, General ITAGAKI, are both men  
5 of experience in the field of civil administration in  
6 the Manchuria and China Areas. They always instructed  
7 and guided their men to educate the natives with bene-  
8 volence and treat them with love. General ITAGAKI es-  
9 tablished his administrative policy, paying special  
10 attention to the improvement of public welfare. The  
11 cardinal points of his policy may be outlined as  
12 follows:  
13

14 "1). Food Policy:

15 "During the period from April 1945 to the end  
16 of the war, supplying food to other areas became to-  
17 tally impossible among the Malay, French Indo-China,  
18 Siam, Sumatra, and Java areas, and import of food from  
19 the home country was also entirely suspended. And com-  
20 munication between Malay, Java and Sumatra became ex-  
21 tremely dangerous, and consequently, each area was  
22 obliged to find a means of self-support with regard  
23 to food. But on Singapore Island and the southern part  
24 of Sumatra, it was difficult to produce or obtain food  
25 from the native population. Consequently, attempts

1 were made, in the face of great danger on the sea,  
2 to import rice from Java and Siam, and during the  
3 period between April and August rice was shipped from  
4 these areas in the following way:

5 "From Java to Singapore...About 20,000  
6 metric tons.

7 "From Java to South Sumatra...About 5,000  
8 metric tons.

9 "From Siam to Malay (Singapore)...About  
10 23,000 metric tons.

11 "Thus public demands were met. On account of  
12 this, the reserve and supply of rice for the army  
13 forces had to be limited.

14 "2). Policy of Dispersion for Singapore  
15 populace.

16 "Since it was expected that with the develop-  
17 ment of the war situation ravages of war would cover  
18 Singapore, they felt the necessity of dispersing the  
19 inhabitants chiefly to the Malay Area, in order to  
20 prevent or minimize the ravages of war and the disper-  
21 sion was already under way. After General ITAGAKI's  
22 arrival at his post this policy was greatly acceler-  
23 ated and was put into practice without delay. As  
24 mentioned before, the food situation at that time was  
25 already very serious, but they distributed to the

1 evacuees provisions for 3 months, and besides this  
2 gave them subsidies, and thus endeavored to prevent  
3 or mitigate the disaster that might be inflicted on  
4 the people and to improve their welfare.

5 "3). Relief Policy for the Bombed Area in  
6 Singapore.

7 "The Japanese armed forces quickly despatched  
8 a relief party to damaged districts whenever Singapore  
9 or its vicinity was bombed and the residential dis-  
10 tricts were damaged. The relief party was in charge  
11 of fire-fighting, rescue work, medical treatment, re-  
12 storing order, etc, at the spot where damage was done.  
13 The military administrative authorities did their best  
14 to relieve the citizens there, distributing special  
15 relief-food to the sufferers. The Japanese residents  
16 also volunteered to render their services in this re-  
17 lief work. Such being the case, the inhabitants there  
18 were very grateful for what the Japanese did over there,  
19 ever so much their kindness.

20 "4). Treatment of the Native Laborers.

21 "In respect to the treatment of native laborers  
22 the Area Army paid much attention to it, since during  
23 General DOHIHARA's tenure of office as commander,  
24 General ITAGAKI, after his arrival at his post, also  
25 gave necessary instructions from time to time to the

troops under his command concerning their treatment. When an important construction work was to begin he would never fail to ask that stipulations be drawn up in its plan in regard to the treatment of native workers. Moreover, he often dispatched officials to inspect and lead the construction work on the spot and helped to set up the medical relief-party, contributing much to the improvement of medical care, sanitation, or provisions. Furthermore, he tried to encourage and accelerate the improvement of the treatment, taking measures to reward the army units or associations which showed good records in the treatment of laborers. Above all, in such cases of construction of alumina works in Bintang Island and the oil plants in Palembang, improvement of sanitation, provisions or other welfare for the laborers concerned was under direct control of the Headquarters of the Area Army and remarkable progress was achieved in its improvement."

1 I finish reading. I should like to insert the

2 Next I call the witness SAITO, Seiei whose  
3 affidavit is defense document No. 2038.

4 These are the actual words I should like

5 S E I E I S A I T O, called as a witness on behalf  
6 of the defense, being first duly sworn, testi-  
7 fied through Japanese interpreters as follows:

8 DIRECT EXAMINATION

9 BY MR. SASAGAWA:

10 Q Mr. Witness, please state your name and  
11 address.

12 A My name is SAITO, Seiei. My address is 73  
13 Chibadera, Chiba City.

14 MR. SASAGAWA: Please show the witness de-  
15 fense document 2038.

16 (Whereupon, a document was handed chi,  
17 to the witness.)

18 Q Is that your affidavit, Mr. SAITO?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Are the contents true and correct?

21 A They are correct. However, there is an  
22 additional statement I would like to make in para-  
23 graph 5. I should like to add the word "Malay" before  
24 "Pw camps and the military detention camps," and be-  
25

1 fore the word "Area Army" I should like to insert the  
2 word "7th." And again, at the end of paragraph 5, I  
3 should like to insert the word "7th" before "Area  
4 Army." Those are the additional words I should like  
5 to insert.

6 MR. SASAGAWA: I offer now defense document  
7 2038 for evidence.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2038  
10 will receive exhibit No. 3313.

11 (Whereupon, the document above  
12 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
13 No. 3313 and received in evidence.)

14 MR. SASAGAWA: I read now exhibit No. 3313:

15 "1. I was born on the 6th October, 1891.  
16 My present address is 73, Chibadera-cho, Chiba-shi,  
17 Japan.

18 "At the time of surrender I was Major General.

19 "2. I held the post of Chief of Java War  
20 Prisoners Camp at Batavia from August 1942 until March,  
21 1944, and served as the Chief of Malay War Prisoners  
22 Camp, Singapore, during the periods from March, 1944  
23 until the end of war, August 1945. Concurrently, I  
24 was the chief of Malay Military Detention Camp (de-  
25 tention of non-military civilians).

1 "3. After the end of war I was detained at  
2 a prison in Singapore from 9th September, 1945. On  
3 30 January 1947 I was released from Changi prison and  
4 returned to Japan in May 1947. As to the treatment of  
5 prisoners, both military or civilian, I have not been  
6 questioned in any way.

7 "4. When I was the chief of the Malay P.W.  
8 Camp, the Commander-in-Chief of the 7th Area Army was  
9 General DOHIHARA, Kenji. He was succeeded by General  
10 ITAGAKI, Seishiro, at the end of April 1945.

11 "5. The Commander-in-Chief of the Area Army  
12 was in direct command of P.W. Camps and the military  
13 detention camps, but orders covering the overall  
14 management of prisoners were issued by Commander-in-  
15 Chief of the Southern Army Marshal TERAUCHI and re-  
16 ceived through the Area Army.

17 "Close liaison had been kept with the central  
18 authorities (War prisoners Information Bureau) and I  
19 attended the conference of the Chiefs of P.W. camps  
20 held in Tokyo in July 1942 and December 1943.

21 "I can definitely state that I had never re-  
22 ceived an order or suggestion from any of these per-  
23 sons referred to above to maltreat prisoners or give  
24 them inhuman treatment.  
25

"6. The treatment, labor task and punish-

1       ments of the prisoners were executed according to the  
2       laws, regulations and orders of the control author-  
3       ities and no special regulations or policy was put  
4       into practice. There had been no violation of the  
5       above laws, regulations and orders.

6                "7. No labor task which had any direct re-  
7       lation with operation had ever been imposed upon pri-  
8       soners. The POW's who did work were given 600 grams  
9       of staple food, the same amount as given to the army  
10      troops. I don't think the working hours were exces-  
11     sive in comparison with those of laborers in general.

12               "8. The food situation in Malay area became  
13     extremely critical around the time when the Allied  
14     Forces intensified their attacks so that both soldiers  
15     and citizens confronted with great difficulties in  
16     obtaining provisions. The military rations were re-  
17     duced from 600 grams to 400 grams and those subsidiary  
18     foods such as meat, vegetables, fish, etc., grew very  
19     scarce. The situation in Singapore was utterly miser-  
20     able, since even before the war foods were entirely  
21     imported. Under the leadership of the military author-  
22     ities every effort was exerted to be self-sufficient  
23     in order to overcome the shortage. But the decrease  
24     of food for PW's was indeed unavoidable. However,  
25     their rations were more or less equal to those of

1 Japanese soldiers. During the worst days the daily  
2 ration became, as I remember, 300 grams per diem.

3 "The condition grew worse near the end of  
4 the war.

5 "9. Medical treatment was not refused and  
6 there had never been such an act as purposely refusing  
7 medical treatment or medicine for prisoners.

8 "10. I heard that after the war a young of-  
9 ficer was reported attempting to commit atrocities to  
10 the prisoners. General ITAGAKI, as I heard, went to  
11 the trouble of calling the said officer to his office  
12 and patiently persuaded him to refrain from such con-  
13 duct, and succeeded in preventing would-be violence.  
14 Whenever I, as the chief of P.W. camps and the deten-  
15 tion camp made various requests in regard to my duties  
16 General ITAGAKI gave me a full assistance as long as  
17 the situation permitted and he had never brought about  
18 an adverse result in the administration of P.W's."

1 May I add one question?

2 BY MR. SASAGAWA (Continued):

3 Q General SAITO, were any sick POW's used for  
4 any labor?

5 A No, none whatsoever.

6 MR. SASAGAWA: That's all.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Mornane.

8 CROSS-EXAMINATION

9 BY COLONEL MORNANE:

10 Q Witness, what were the names of the prison-  
11 er of war and internment camps under your command?

12 A There was one branch camp of the Malay POW  
13 Camp at Singapore.

14 Q What was the name of that one?

15 A The third branch camp.

16 Q What about Changi Camp? Wasn't that under  
17 your command?

18 A Changi was one of the branch camps which was  
19 under my direct control.

20 Q Well, could you tell me the names of the  
21 various branch camps that were under your direct  
22 control?

23 A The first and second branch camps; these  
24 were in Sumatra. And as far as supervision of pris-  
25 oners of war went, the chain of command, I was not in

1 the direct chain of command.

2 Q What I am asking you, witness, is to tell us  
3 the names of the various branch camps that comprised  
4 the third branch camp.

5 A The third branch camp mainly had Indian  
6 prisoners of war -- had control mainly of Indian  
7 prisoners of war. There were four camps, I believe,  
8 but I have forgotten their locations. They were all  
9 inside Singapore City.

10 Q Was there a camp at Changi jail?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Was there a civilian internment camp, a Changi  
13 internment camp?

14 A Two months after my arrival in Singapore I  
15 transferred that camp elsewhere.

16 Q What did it then become after you transferred  
17 it?

18 A I was there until the end of the war.

19 Q No, but this camp, the Changi internment camp,  
20 what happened to the people that were in that camp a  
21 few months after your arrived at Singapore?

22 A They were transferred to another camp.  
23 Prisoners of war who had hitherto been held in an  
24 air field near Changi were transferred to Changi  
25 jail and kept there.

1 Q Well, both those camps were under your con-  
2 trol.

3 A Yes.

4 Q Now, do you know a camp called Kranji No. 1?

5 A I believe there is a hospital at Kranji.

6 Q Was that under your control?

7 A Yes.

8 Q In addition to the hospital there was a  
9 Kranji No. 2, was there not?

10 A We did not have a detention camp there.

11 Q But at all events the operation of whatever  
12 you had at Kranji No. 2 was under your control?

13 A I cannot now recall Kranji No. 2. However,  
14 I do know that at Kranji there was a hospital where  
15 Indian POW's were interned and also another hospital  
16 where white men -- white prisoners of war were in-  
17 terned.

18 Q Now, do you remember a place called Blakang  
19 Mati: B-l-a-k-a-n-g M-a-t-i?

20 A No.

21 Q You had nothing to do with such a place?

22 A Yes, I do remember Blakang Mati.

23 Q And a working party of prisoners of war were  
24 kept there, were they not?

25 A I forget the exact number at the present

1 date. However, I do know that a party had been sent  
2 there before my arrival and that a unit there had  
3 charge of them.

4 Q They were not under your control at all?

5 A The unit responsible for the supervision of  
6 those POW's was the unit on the spot. There were  
7 occasions when either I or my subordinates went there  
8 on inspection tours.

9 Q Well, now, Outran Road Jail, was that under  
10 your control?

11 A No.

12 Q Under whose control was that?

13 A I believe it was under some army control.

14 Q Wasn't it the 7th Area Army that controlled  
15 that?

16 A In the ordinary course of events, I believe  
17 that is so. However, I am not my recollection on  
18 that point is not accurate.

19 Q Now, take the Siam Road Military Police  
20 Camp; was that under your control?

21 A I had nothing to do with the gendarmes.

22 Q You know the place that I mean?

23 A I believe that Siam Road is the place where  
24 there was a camp for general civilian internees.

25 Q And that was not under your control.

1 A I did control general civilian internee  
2 camps.

3 Q Including the Fiam Road Camp?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Well, with regard to prisoner of war labor,  
6 the 7th Area Army would request you to supply labor  
7 each day, would they not?

8 A Orders would come from the Army: so many  
9 men here, so many men there; and in accordance with  
10 such orders, I disposed of the prisoners of war.

11 Q And you have received from the men complaints  
12 as to their treatment while they've been out on these  
13 working projects, have you not?

14 A No, never.

15 Q Did you not on one occasion go so far as to  
16 refuse to send the men out until you got some assur-  
17 ance that they would be better treated?

18 A Yes, I did once.

19 Q And was that not as a result of complaints  
20 you had from the men as to their treatment?

21 A I had understood your "complaints" to mean  
22 those particularly in regard to food, but now I under-  
23 stand you mean they apply to general conditions.

24 Q Well, you did have complaints from the men  
25 as to the general conditions.

1 A Yes.

2 Q Such as ill treatment while on the working  
3 projects.

4 A Yes.

5 COLONEL MORNANE: That concludes the cross-  
6 examination.

7 MR. SASAGAWA: No redirect. May the wit-  
8 ness be excused.

9 THE PRESIDENT: He is released on the usual  
10 terms.

11 (Whereupon, the witness was ex-  
12 cused.)

13 MR. SASAGAWA: Next I call the witness  
14 UESUGI, Motoyuki, whose affidavit is defense document  
15 No. 2512.

16 - - -  
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1 MOTOYUKI UE-UGI, called as a witness  
2 on behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,  
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as fol-  
4 lows:

5 DIRECT EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. SASAGAWA:

7 Q Will the witness state his name and address.

8 A My name is UE-UGI, Motoyuki. My address is  
9 68 Mayatani, Fukuoka City.

10 MR. SASAGAWA: Will you show the witness de-  
11 fense document 2512?

12 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
13 to the witness.)

14 Q Is that your affidavit?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Are the contents true and correct?

17 A They are true and correct.

18 MR. SASAGAWA: I offer in evidence defense  
19 document No. 2512.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

21 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No.  
22 2512 will receive exhibit No. 3314.

23 (Whereupon, the document above  
24 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
25 No. 3314 and received in evidence.)

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1 MR. SASAGAWA: I read exhibit 3314:

2 "1. I am a former army major; I live at  
3 present at No. 68 Mayatani in Fukuoka City.

4 "I was a staff officer of the Seventh Area  
5 Army in charge of supply and communications from  
6 March 1, 1945 up to the end of the war. After the  
7 cessation of hostilities, I served as Chief of the  
8 Liaison Section of the Japanese Army in Singapore and  
9 acted in liaison with the British forces up to July,  
10 1946.

11 "The Commander of the Seventh Area Army was  
12 General ITAGAKI, Seishiro, from April 22, 1945 up to  
13 the end of the war.

14 "2. I have read IPS evidence No. 1514-A.  
15 When I was the chief of the liaison section in Singa-  
16 pore after the end of the war, I heard that the Third  
17 Japanese Air Force in Singapore had entrusted the  
18 'Utoram' Prison with the care of the allied air force  
19 prisoners about June, 1945, without informing thereof  
20 to the HQs of the Seventh Area Army under whose juris-  
21 diction the prison came. Also that some junior offi-  
22 cers of the Third Japanese Air Force had arbitrarily  
23 withdrawn and executed the prisoners later.

24 "The above-mentioned allied airmen, when  
25 they had made an air raid upon Sumatra and Palembang,

1 were taken prisoners by the 9th Japanese Air Division  
2 in Palembang and sent to the above-mentioned Third  
3 Air Force.

4 "The junior staff officers of the Third  
5 Japanese Air Force who had arbitrarily executed the  
6 allied airmen committed suicide after the end of the  
7 war, and Colonel SATO, the then senior staff officer,  
8 killed himself as well from his sense of responsi-  
9 bility for leading the junior officers.

10 "3. The Third Air Force was under the  
11 direct control of the Southern Army and on equal  
12 terms with the Seventh Area Army and the Seventh  
13 Area Army had consequently no right of command over  
14 the Third Air Force, other than in commanding field  
15 operations in the event that land warfare broke out.

16 "4. While General ITAGAKI held the post of  
17 Commander of the Seventh Area Army, there was not a  
18 case except the above air force one where any prisoner  
19 and others were unlawfully executed in the 'Utoram'  
20 Prison.

21 "5. I have read IPS evidence No. 1614-A.  
22 When I was the chief of the liaison section in Singa-  
23 pore after the end of the war, I was informed by the  
24 counsel concerned in the trial that the inhabitants  
25 of Boatblare (TN: phonetic) in the Andaman Islands

1 had been forced by the naval forces to evacuate to  
2 another small island in August, 1945, and that many  
3 of them had consequently died. This was a case  
4 which took place in the naval area of the Andaman  
5 Island. Eight naval officers and men, including  
6 Vice-Admiral HARA, the Commander of the 12th Base  
7 Unit of the Japanese Navy, were accused and executed  
8 as the responsible individuals at Singapore. The  
9 Andaman Island was one of the naval administrative  
10 areas and the Army could not participate in its  
11 administration at all.

12 "The only authority General ITAGAKI had over  
13 the naval forces was to command them as well, in the  
14 event a land battle should have occurred."

15 May I address two questions to the witness?

16 Q Mr. UESUGI, under whose command were the  
17 Andaman and Nicobar Islands?

18 A The defense of the Andaman and Nicobar  
19 Islands was the responsibility of the navy but as  
20 the war situation became urgent, on February 5, 1945,  
21 the commander of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was  
22 made responsible to the commander of the 29th Army  
23 in so far as defense on land alone was concerned.

24 Q What were the conditions of the transport  
25 and communication between Malaya and Andaman and

Nicobar Islands?

1           A    Since the beginning of 1945, because of the  
2 allied air and sea offensive, all traffic and commun-  
3 ications between the islands and the mainland were  
4 cut off and the islands became isolated. In order  
5 to carry out a last attempt to supply the Andaman  
6 and Nicobar Islands and also in order to withdraw a  
7 part of the garrison defending those islands in  
8 order to strengthen the defenses of Singapore, the  
9 15th Fleet based at Singapore sent out a fleet with  
10 the cruiser Ashigara at its head; but the cruiser  
11 Ashigara was sunk off Penang and this objective was  
12 not accomplished. After this final attempt sea  
13 communications were completely cut off.  
14

15           It was also impossible to use airplanes  
16 because of allied air attacks. Therefore during the  
17 year 1945 not a single staff officer either of the  
18 7th Area Army or of the 29th Army was able to go to  
19 the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

20           We did have wireless communications with  
21 those islands but because of the shortage of batteries  
22 we were not able to use them as much as we would like.  
23 Indeed communications, wireless communications, were  
24 restricted to a bare minimum and only the messages of  
25 utmost urgency were sent.

1 MR. SASAGAWA: That finishes my examination.  
2 You may cross-examine.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Mornane.

4 CROSS-EXAMINATION

5 BY COLONEL MORNANE:

6 Q Witness, I suggest to you that the true  
7 position with regard to the command of the Andaman  
8 and Nicobar Islands was this: that as a result of  
9 an agreement in October of 1944 between the naval  
10 and army authorities the army took over the defense  
11 of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as from November  
12 of 1944, is that not so?

13 A No, that is not so. Until the 5th of  
14 February 1945 the navy was in charge of the defense  
15 of those islands.

16 Q Coming to another matter, when did you first  
17 know anything about the unlawful execution of prisoners  
18 at Outram Road Jail?

19 A When I was chief of liaison in Singapore.

20 Q When was that?

21 A I believe it was around May of 1946.

22 Q That was roughly a year after it had taken  
23 place?

24 A Yes.

25 Q And while the war was still on you had nothing

to do with Outram Road Jail at all?

1           A   While the war was still on I had nothing  
2 to do with that camp.

3           Q   And you didn't know what was happening at  
4 Outram Road Jail during the war?

5           A   No, I didn't.

6           Q   Then on what do you base the fourth para-  
7 graph of your affidavit where you say: "While  
8 General ITAGAKI held the post of Commander of the  
9 Seventh Area Army, there was not a case except the  
10 above air force one where any prisoner and others  
11 were unlawfully executed in the 'Utoram' Prison"?

12           A   While I was chief of the liaison section  
13 in Singapore I was in continual contact with the  
14 British authorities concerned, namely, the theater  
15 intelligence units, war crimes investigation units;  
16 I also conducted investigation based on direct  
17 orders from Colonel Wild. Based on these orders I  
18 conducted investigations and made reports on these  
19 investigations but during the course of these in-  
20 vestigations I never unearthed a single instance  
21 other than the one mentioned in my affidavit.  
22

23           Q   Witness, that prosecution exhibit that you  
24 refer to, No. 1514-A, contains the following in its  
25 fourteenth paragraph, does it not: "In all between

1 May and July, 1945, I saw 17 Allied airmen and 15  
2 Chinese civilians taken out in similar circumstances  
3 for execution. The burial party returned but the  
4 prisoners did not. The burial party were in a dirty  
5 condition, as though they had been digging when they  
6 returned. I had some contact with the airmen as I  
7 was engaged in taking latrine cans to and from their  
8 cells. They told me that they had not been tried."

9 You have read that, of course?

10 A Yes, I did.

11 Q So all your evidence amounts to on that  
12 point is that you do not know of any other unlawful  
13 executions?

14 A That is to say, other than item No. 1, that  
15 is to say, the execution of the nine Allied airmen.

16 COLONEL MORNANE: Yes that concludes the  
17 cross-examination.

18 MR. SASAGAWA: There will be no redirect.  
19 May the witness be excused on the usual terms?

20 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused accordingly.

21 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

22 MR. SASAGAWA: I wish to call at this stage  
23 TAKAYAMA, Hikoichi, whose affidavit is defense docu-  
24 ment No. 2615.  
25

1 H I K O I C H I T A K A Y A M A, called as a witness  
2 on behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,  
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as follows:

4 DIRECT EXAMINATION

5 BY MR. SASAGAWA:

6 Q Mr. Witness, please state your full name and  
7 address.

8 A My name is TAKAYAMA, Hikoichi, and my address  
9 is No. 89 Minami-Kuruwamachi, Maebashi City, Gumma  
10 Prefecture.

11 MR. SASAGAWA: Please show to Mr. TAKAYAMA  
12 defense document No. 2615.

13 (Whereupon, a document was shown to  
14 the witness.)

15 Q Is that your affidavit?

16 A Yes, it is.

17 Q Are the contents true and correct?

18 A They are true and correct.

19 MR. SASAGAWA: I offer defense document 2615  
20 in evidence.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2615  
23 will receive exhibit No. 3315.

24 (Whereupon, the document above  
25 referred to was marked defense exhibit No.

3315 and received in evidence.)

MR. SHERMAN: I now read exhibit 3315:

"1. I was a Staff Officer of the 37th Army in North Borneo from September 1944 till the termination of the war.

"My last rank was Colonel.

"Now I live at No. 89 Minami-Kuruwamachi, Maebashi-Shi, Gumma Prefecture.

"2. It was about the latter part of May 1945 when the 37th Army was transferred from the direct control of the South Seas Expeditionary Army and put under the command of the 7th Area Army.

"3. The Prisoner of War Camp of North Borneo was controlled by the Headquarters of the South Seas Expeditionary Army. By the regulations and orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the South Seas Expeditionary Army, the 37th Army commander was entrusted with supplying the POW's and to issue orders within limited sphere to the Chief of the Prisoner of War Camp, in regard to defense measures (guard, air defense, land fighting), etc.

"It was, however, not within his capacity to interfere in the management of the Prisoners of War.

"4. About January 1945 the Commander of the 37th Army received instructions from the Commander-in-

1 Chief of the South Seas Expeditionary Army to move the  
2 main forces of the Army, then stationed in the north  
3 east of Borneo, to the west coast of the Island.

4 "In accordance with the instructions, the  
5 Commander of the 37th Army ordered the main forces  
6 stationed on the east coast of Borneo to move to the  
7 west coast and this order was carried out. At the same  
8 time he ordered the transfer of POW's of the Allied  
9 Forces in the vicinity of Sandakan to a basin near  
10 Ranau (phonetic) from the viewpoint of defense, taking  
11 into consideration the danger of bombings and the  
12 pressing food situation in the Sandakan District.  
13 The Ranau area was then comparatively safe and self-  
14 sufficient in food. The transfer of POW's was carried  
15 out by order on two occasions at the end of January  
16 and in the early part of May 1945.

17 "5. About May 1945 bombings by the Allied  
18 Forces became so intense that the communication by sea  
19 between North Borneo and French Indo-China, Malay, etc.  
20 was entirely cut off and also that by air was in great  
21 difficulty.

22 "The Headquarters of the 37th Army moved from  
23 Jesselton to Sabon (phonetic) in the beginning of May  
24 1945.

25 "The Keningo (phonetic) air-field was employed

1 for use of planes acting as liaison between the Army  
2 Headquarters and the outside but it took about one day  
3 to go between the Headquarters and the air-field.  
4 Although the telephone was operated between the points,  
5 it was frequently broken.

6 "Only radio was available for communication  
7 with the 7th Area Army, but the apparatus was frequently  
8 broken as the machine had been removed from Jesselton  
9 just before that time. Besides that, owing to the  
10 shortage of fuel and batteries, communication schedule  
11 hours were greatly cut down. Thus, the communication  
12 was run in an extremely inefficient way, and was  
13 limited solely to the matters of most importance. Even  
14 this was often interrupted. The situation grew worse  
15 as the war neared its end."

16 You may cross-examine.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Mornane.

18 COLONEL MORNANE: There will be no cross-  
19 examination, if the Tribunal please.  
20

21 MR. SASAGAWA: May the witness be excused on  
22 the usual terms?

23 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused accordingly.

24 (Whereupon the witness was excused.)

25 MR. SASAGAWA: Mr. Mattice will continue,  
if the Tribunal please.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mattice.

1 MR. MATTICE: I now call the accused ITAGAKI  
2 to the witness stand.

3 - - -

4 S E I S H I R O I T A G A K I, an accused, being  
5 first duly sworn, testified through Japanese  
6 interpreters as follows:

7 DIRECT EXAMINATION

8 BY MR. MATTICE:

9 Q You may state your name.

10 A ITAGAKI, Seishiro.

11 Q General, you are one of the accused in this trial,  
12 are you not, and have been in custody since some date  
13 prior to the beginning of this trial, have you not?

14 A Yes.

15 MR. MATTICE: May the witness be shown defense  
16 document 2555?

17 Q You may tell the Tribunal, General, if this  
18 defense document marked 2555 is your affidavit.

19 A This is my affidavit.

20 Q Are the contents thereof true?

21 A They are true.

22 MR. MATTICE: It is offered in evidence.  
23  
24  
25

THE PRESIDENT: Judge Nyi.

1 JUDGE NYI: May it please the Tribunal, the  
2 prosecution objects to that part of the affidavit which  
3 begins with the third paragraph on page 10, beginning  
4 with the sentence: "In view of the fact", up to the end  
5 of the first paragraph on page 13, ending with the  
6 sentence: "we must force ourselves upon them." This  
7 part of the affidavit purports to be the statement  
8 of General HONJO, made public in October 1931 at the  
9 Kwantung Army Headquarters. Inasmuch as the original  
10 of the document is not produced, we object to this  
11 part of the affidavit.  
12

13 THE PRESIDENT: Well, this may have been a  
14 speech or it may have been something he read. We  
15 don't know. That could be ascertained from the witness  
16 later on.

17 JUDGE NYI: Your Honor, we object to it further  
18 on the ground that it properly should be in the general  
19 phase. There is no particular reference to the present  
20 accused.

21 THE PRESIDENT: The accused himself is giving  
22 evidence here and he can state the things that influenced  
23 him. That is a matter we may have to elaborate upon  
24 later.-- the defense of honest and reasonable, but  
25 mistaken, belief in a state of facts.

MR. MATTICE: Is the document admitted?

THE PRESIDENT: The document is admitted on the usual terms. I can not say the first objection is overruled because we have not heard enough yet, but we will continue to apply our document rules.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2555 will receive exhibit No. 3316.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked defense exhibit No. 3316 and received in evidence.)

MR. MATTICE: Omitting the formal parts --

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mattice, I think at this hour we will recess for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mattice.

4 MR. MATTICE (Reading):

5 "I. DURING THE PERIOD AS STAFF OFFICER OF  
6 THE KWANTUNG ARMY (1st May, 1929 - 30th July, 1932).

7 "1. I was appointed staff officer of the  
8 Kwantung Army (Army Colonel) on 1st May, 1929, the  
9 4th year of Showa, and held that post until 30 July  
10 1932, the 7th year of Showa. The Commander-in-Chief  
11 of the Kwantung Army at the time of my above appoint-  
12 ment was Lieutenant-General Eitaro HATA. At the time  
13 of the Manchurian Incident the Commander-in-Chief of  
14 the Kwantung Army was Lieutenant-General HONJO,  
15 Shigeru, and the Chief of Staff was Major-General  
16 MIYAKE, Mitsuji.

17 "My duties were to receive orders from the  
18 Chief of Staff and to maintain contact between staff  
19 officers and manage the staff office, and also attend  
20 to liaison business of the army.

21 "As for the duties and privileges of the  
22 Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, the Chief  
23 of Staff and staff officers, they are ruled in the  
24 Regulations of the Kwantung Army Headquarters (court  
25 exhibit No. 1415).

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1           "2. General situation in Manchuria before  
2 the Manchurian Incident, as follows:

3           "(a) In China, since 1925, a movement for  
4 the recovery of alleged lost national rights had been  
5 started and anti-Japanese actions became increasingly  
6 active. In Manchuria also there occurred violations  
7 of Japan's rights and interests. In June, 1928, the  
8 3rd year of Showa, Chang Tsuo-lin was killed by a  
9 bomb and Chang Hsueh-liang succeeded him. In the  
10 same year the Chang Hsueh-liang regime affiliated  
11 with the Nanking Government, changed the Manchurian  
12 color, adopted the 'blue sky and white sun' ensign  
13 and letting influences of the Chinese Nationalist  
14 Party penetrate into Manchuria. The anti-Japanese  
15 movement there was organized under the direction of  
16 the Kuomintang and government offices and it became  
17 very active and intense. The Japanese rights in  
18 Manchuria were infringed and the Japanese nationals  
19 were squeezed in the belt-like strip along the South  
20 Manchurian Railway. The extreme pressure against the  
21 Korean immigrants, violence and oppression of the  
22 Japanese and obstruction to communication, etc. were  
23 intensified and increased in number. In spite of  
24 the earnest and sincere cooperative policy of Foreign  
25 Minister SHIDEHARA, no prospect for relaxation of the

1 anti-Japanese activities in China was in sight, and  
2 the situation was continuously aggravated. Just be-  
3 fore the outbreak of the incident several hundred  
4 questions were pending.

5       "(b) On the other hand, in the military  
6 field, Chang Hsueh-liang, since taking office as the  
7 Vice-Commander of the Kuomintang Army in the Fall  
8 of 1928, planned to strengthen and reorganize the  
9 army under his control, and he increased the strength  
10 of the standing army to two hundred odd thousand,  
11 enlarged the scale of the Mukden Arsenal, equipped  
12 the army with such modern arms as tanks and air-  
13 planes and strengthened the system of discipline.  
14 Thus he endeavored to raise both the quality and the  
15 quantity of his army, and as a result, as compared  
16 with the Kwantung Army at that time, not only in its  
17 strength but in its equipment, his army was far  
18 superior to it.

19       "Since then the anti-Japanese sentiments  
20 gradually influencing the Chinese troops, they as-  
21 sumed a contemptuous attitude toward the Japanese  
22 troops, boasting of the superiority of the Chinese  
23 Army and the abundance of their experiences of actual  
24 fighting through engaging in yearly internal wars, and  
25 the anti-Japanese sentiments of the officers and men

1 became very vigorous. Moreover, the disposition  
2 of the Chinese troops was changed so as to encircle  
3 our garrison areas along the South Manchurian Rail-  
4 ways and the Kwantung troops which had been placed  
5 dispersedly, fell into a situation extremely danger-  
6 ous from the military point of view. That is to say,  
7 that while no more than ten odd thousand Kwantung  
8 troops, with the inferior equipment and formation,  
9 had been stationed dispersedly, still on peace-  
10 time footing, in the area almost one thousand kilome-  
11 ters long, along the South Manchurian Railway, they  
12 came to be placed under siege by the large force of  
13 two hundred thousand odd Chinese troops, equipped  
14 with superior arms, burning with anti-Japanese  
15 sentiments, and assuming a most provocative attitude.

16 "3. With the anti-Japanese situation in-  
17 creasingly aggravated and the Chinese troops aflame  
18 with anti-Japanese sentiments, a danger of collision  
19 between the Japanese and Chinese armies had thus been  
20 gradually fermented. The solution of the situation  
21 seemed extremely difficult unless either the Japanese  
22 or Chinese would concede or compromise, because the  
23 situation between Japan and China at that time was  
24 the collision between the conflicting demands, the  
25 recovery of China's alleged lost rights and the

1 maintenance of our rights and interests. But the  
2 Chinese had no intention at all to compromise and  
3 the situation was that anti-Japanism by force of  
4 arms would be inevitable. If we were to avoid it,  
5 there was no solution for us except to abandon  
6 all the special rights and interest we had in  
7 political, economic and military fields generally.  
8 However, such a thing as the wholesale abandonment  
9 of our rights and interests was not only what our  
10 government could not undertake but also what the  
11 national public opinion would not permit. There-  
12 fore, as for the Kwantung Army, they tried hard to  
13 avoid friction with the Chinese, sought all means  
14 of appeasement, admonished our officers and men to  
15 be patient and cautious, prohibiting any rash acts.

16 "However, on the other hand, they were under  
17 the necessity to working out an emergency counter-  
18 measure in case of collision between the Japanese  
19 and Chinese troops, which might happen by positive  
20 military actions on the part of the Chinese. The  
21 Kwantung Army, in order to deal with the pressing  
22 situation desired to increase its strength, change  
23 the disposition of its troops, and replete its equip-  
24 ment, but this desire was not approved by the central  
25 authorities of the army. Therefore, the Kwantung

1 Army mapped out a plan with the then existing  
2 strength and equipment, without getting assistance  
3 from the central authorities since the previous year.  
4 They established a plan of operations that in case  
5 of collision between the Chinese and the Japanese  
6 troops, the Kwantung Army would concentrate its  
7 main forces in the vicinity of Mukden and deliver  
8 a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese forces  
9 in Mukden, and thus by sealing the fate of the  
10 enemy, would settle the matter within a short period.  
11 They decided to make preparations necessary for  
12 education, training, communication, transportation  
13 and other things, in accordance with the above plan,  
14 and to make up for the shortcomings of the fighting  
15 power by utilizing the material for military opera-  
16 tions, which could be found in Manchuria, to the  
17 best possible advantage.

18 "It was a part of that plan that they set  
19 two heavy guns in the premises of the Mukden Inde-  
20 pendent Garrison Barracks in Mukden. These guns  
21 were those which became needless as the result of  
22 scaling down of the fortifications at Port Arthur,  
23 and were appropriated. It was a natural step to  
24 make up the shortage of the fighting power, and it  
25 was in order not to stimulate the Chinese in the

1 peace time that they concealed the setting up of  
2 these guns. Commander-in-Chief HONJO, who had  
3 taken the post and arrived in August 1931, actually  
4 witnessed repeated occurrences of incidents due to  
5 the intensification of anti-Japanese feeling, es-  
6 pecially such serious cases as killing Captain  
7 NAKAMURA, Wanpaoshan Incident, and disturbances  
8 staged against the troops guarding railways in  
9 various places and on their practice maneuvers,  
10 read out the mounting tension of the situation.  
11 Then he strictly warned the officers and enlisted  
12 men against any rash act, but at the same time in-  
13 structed them to the execution of their duties  
14 positively and decidedly once emergency arose.

15 "4. I was accompanying Commander-in-Chief  
16 HONJO on his informal inspection trips of the troops  
17 under his command, and finished the trips with the  
18 inspection of the troops located at Liaoyan on  
19 18 September 1931 (6th year of Showa). On the same  
20 day Commander-in-Chief HONJO was informed by the  
21 Chief of Staff MIYAKE that Major-General TATERAWA,  
22 the Chief of the First Department of the General  
23 Staff Office, was coming to Mukden; and MIYAKE  
24 requested him to send either ISHIWARA or me, staff  
25 officers, to Mukden to meet the Major General.

Assuming that the matter would probably be in connection with the terms of negotiation on the case of NAKAMURA, Shintaro, Commander-in-Chief HONJO ordered me to go to Mukden. Accordingly, I went to Mukden from Liaoyan. Toward evening that day, Major General TATEKAWA arrived, and I greeted and dined with him, the Major General saying that having left Tokyo in a hurry he missed the special train and was unable to take sufficient rest in the crowded coach, and he was worn out. Since he was scheduled to stay there for a few days, he did not incline to mention his business immediately, except a few words to the effect that the superiors were worrying about the careless and unscrupulous conduct of the young officers. I answered that there was no need of worrying if it was the business, and remarked that I would hear him at leisure the next day, because he seemed tired out. Then we closed the talk, and I took leave to return to my billet.

"5. On my way to the billet after taking leave of Major General TATEKAWA, as I was concerned with the case of NAKAMURA, Shintaro, I went to the Special Service Section of Mukden in order to get further information about it, but as there was no further news I chatted for a while with the staffs.

1 Just as I was going to return to my billet there  
2 was a telephone from the garrison troops, calling  
3 the Special Service Section, and reported the case  
4 of blasting up the railway line at Liuchiaokou. By  
5 several following contacts by telephone, I under-  
6 stood that just after 10:00 p. m. Chinese troops  
7 blasted the rail line of the South Manchurian Rail-  
8 way at the western side of Peitaying, north of  
9 Mukden, and the patrolling scouts of the company of  
10 Hushihtai received shots from the enemy lying in  
11 ambush. Upon receiving the information the company  
12 of Hushihtai hurriedly went to their rescue, col-  
13 lided and engaged in a battle with Chinese troops.  
14 Although they had occupied a corner of Peitaying  
15 in spite of the enemy's resistance, with the enemy  
16 increasing machine guns and infantry guns, the  
17 company was hard pressed. From the report of the  
18 railway guard it was clear that the incident was not  
19 a mere infringement upon rights and interests in the  
20 shape of blasting the railway, but a planned chal-  
21 lenge of the Chinese Regular Army against the Japanese  
22 Army; and it was judged that the Seventh Brigade of  
23 Peitaying was in action against us. Therefore, I  
24 keenly felt the risk was so close that if we hesi-  
25 tated a moment the leased territories attached to

the South Manchurian Railway and the Japanese troops would be encircled and attacked by the Chinese Army in Mukden.

SHIMAMOTO, the Second Battalion Commander of the Independent Infantry Garrison, stated that he would immediately go to rescue with all his troops the Hospital Company, which was in a desperate battle at a corner of Pailaying, and HIRATA, the 29th Regimental Commander, who had been informed of the situation, declared that he, as the commander of the garrison, would cooperate with SHIMAMOTO's Battalion by attacking the Mukden Wall with all the power under his command.

"In the capacity of a staff officer who happened to be present there, I accepted their determination and took steps to report to the Commander-in-Chief that the Independent Garrison would fight it out with the enemy at Pailaying and the 29th Regiment against the enemy within Mukden. The reason why I accepted was:

"(1) The determination of the above commanders was absolutely necessary, in the line with the plan of operations of the army in case of emergency, not only for the self-defense of the troops in Mukden, but also for the benefit of the activities of the main force of the army.

1 "At that moment Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO  
2 and Colonel HIRATA sent the word to the Commander-in-  
3 Chief and others through the Special Service Section  
4 of Mukden. SHIMAMOTO, the Second Battalion Commander  
5 of the Independent Infantry Garrison, stated that he  
6 would immediately go to rescue with all his troops the  
7 Hushihtai Company, which was in a desperate battle at  
8 a corner of Peitaying, and HIRATA, the 29th Regimental  
9 Commander, who had been informed of the situation,  
10 declared that he, as the commander of the garrison,  
11 made up his mind to cooperate with SHIMAMOTO's battalion  
12 by attacking the Mukden Wall with all the power under  
13 his command.

14 "In the capacity of a staff officer who hap-  
15 pened to be present there, I accepted their determina-  
16 tions and took steps to report to the Commander-in-Chief  
17 that the Independence Garrison would fight it out with  
18 the enemy at Peitaying and the 29th Regiment against the  
19 enemy within Mukden. The reason why I accepted was:

20 "(i) The determination of the above commanders  
21 was absolutely necessary, in the line with the plan  
22 of operations of the army in case of emergency, not  
23 only for the self-defense of the troops in Mukden, but  
24 also for the benefit of the activities of the main force  
25 of the army;

1           "(ii) I thought it was necessary to give  
2 these commanders assurance in taking actions according  
3 to their determinations by my acknowledgment, since I  
4 as a staff officer was fully conversant with the inten-  
5 tions of the Commander-in-Chief previously.

6           "When I reported the details of the above  
7 steps to the Commander-in-Chief HONJO as the headquar-  
8 ters of the Kwantung Army moved to Mukden on 19 Septem-  
9 ber, he approved the steps as they completely coincided  
10 with his intentions.

11           "6. On the night of 18th September we informed  
12 the Consulate-General of Mukden by telephone of the  
13 outbreak of the incident and of the actions taken by  
14 the army, and asking Consul MORISHIMA to come up to  
15 the Special Service office, we explained the circum-  
16 stances in detail and asked for his cooperation. I  
17 also talked about the matter with Consul-General HAYASHI  
18 several times by telephone. Consul-General HAYASHI  
19 said that, as Japan and China had not yet formally  
20 entered the war, and as the Chinese, through consultant  
21 Chao Hsin-po, had announced their adoption of the  
22 principle of non-resistance he hoped that the army would  
23 arrange the matter so it could be dealt with through  
24 diplomatic agents, putting an end to the military  
25 actions on the part of Japan at that time. In reply to

1 his assertion, I explained the following in detail and  
2 asked his reconsideration. That is to say, the inci-  
3 dent this time was different from those of the prede-  
4 cessors, because the regular army of the Chinese had  
5 challenged the Japanese Army; the fighting between the  
6 Chinese and the Japanese was already under way, and  
7 it was impossible for the present to separate them.

8 "Anyway, unless the present military actions  
9 would be settled it was practically impossible to place  
10 the case to the diplomatic negotiations. Though the  
11 Chinese were saying that the Chinese were completely  
12 abiding by the principle of non-resistance, according  
13 to the report from the frontier, they were attacking  
14 at Hushihtai, causing dead and injured. I could not  
15 imagine that Chao Hsin-po would be able to arrange a  
16 cease-fire agreement on his own responsibility, because  
17 he was a mere civil official, having no influence in  
18 military affairs. Particularly what had to be considered  
19 was that it could not be known whether it might not prove  
20 to be the enemy's habitual trick in order that they  
21 might rearrange the situation by gaining time, making  
22 the actions of the Japanese Army delayed and relaxed.  
23 I told him we had to be careful, that the condition  
24 was of such a grave nature that it permitted no hesi-  
25 tation. I also pointed out that the realization of

1 Consul-General HAYASHI's contention was practically  
2 impossible in the light of then actual situations.

3 "7. The battle around Mukden terminated on  
4 the 19th September. However, as all the Chinese  
5 functionaries who were holding important posts of the  
6 city administration had fled, the police, communications,  
7 and the banking services all came to a standstill.  
8 All the citizens closed their doors and the city became  
9 utterly chaotic. The convicts came out of the prison  
10 and ran rampant on the streets. Thus the situation  
11 became so bad that we could not leave it that way even  
12 for a moment, in the interests of public safety. In  
13 view of the above circumstances, and also to cope with  
14 the earnest desire of the citizens, the Army Commander  
15 HONJO, for the purpose of maintaining public safety,  
16 promulgated immediately an emergency municipal adminis-  
17 tration and appointed Colonel DOHIHARA as the temporary  
18 Mayor. The Kwantung Army had no intention of insti-  
19 tuting a military administration. They did not admit  
20 any other soldier than Colonel DOHIHARA to take part  
21 in the administration and apart from a few Japanese  
22 advisors, the greater part of the functionaries were  
23 Chinese nationals. Thus its purpose was to maintain  
24 the public peace as a temporary measure with the  
25 arrangement that whenever a qualified Chinese was

1 available the power of administration should immediately  
2 be transferred to him.

3 "Colonel DOHIHARA served only one month as  
4 temporary Mayor, and on the 20th October Mr. Chao  
5 Hsin-po became Mayor and almost all of the advisors  
6 were removed.

7 "8. Commander-in-Chief HONJO had been too  
8 cautious to disclose any of his political opinions  
9 during the course of the hostilities of the Manchurian  
10 Incident.

11 "However, when the independence declaration  
12 of each province of Manchuria as well as of some  
13 influential persons therein created a general tendency  
14 throughout Manchuria that the establishment of a new  
15 state was inevitable, he made public, at the end of  
16 October 1931 at Kwantung Army Headquarters, the follow-  
17 ing important statement:

18 "In view of the fact that the Sino-Japanese  
19 conflict which had existed before the Manchurian Inci-  
20 dent led itself to the present regrettable all-out  
21 clash between the two countries, we must make certain  
22 that an unfortunate incident of this nature should never  
23 happen again. In order to do so, we must devise  
24 measures with which to settle the incident to the  
25 complete satisfaction of both countries. The first

1 step toward materialization of this measure would be  
2 to pay high regard to the expressed desire of the whole  
3 Manchurian people.

4 "The anti-Japanese movement which had been  
5 conducted before the present incident contributed to  
6 creating among the Chinese people an anti-Japanese  
7 sentiment, which finally developed into a bitter feeling  
8 of enmity.

9 "This feeling seems to have been eliminated  
10 now, but we must go a step further to completely wipe  
11 it out from their mind by enhancing the spirit of racial  
12 harmony to such extent that the people of both countries  
13 feel no racial discrimination among them.

14 "So long as Japan maintains her special rights  
15 and interests in Manchuria, it cannot help causing a  
16 sense of inequality and a sense of being oppressed among  
17 the Manchurian people, no matter how legally right  
18 Japan's rights and interests, from the viewpoint of  
19 international law, may be. Therefore, Japan should  
20 voluntarily give up her rights and interests there,  
21 renounce her special right of extraterritoriality and  
22 should return Port Arthur and Dairen to Manchuria, if,  
23 by doing so, the relations between the two countries  
24 can attain such standard as where the interests of  
25 both countries become identical and where the sense of

racial discrimination no longer exists.

1           "Since the Japanese and the Manchurian people  
2 are the elements constituting the state of Manchuria,  
3 based on the equal footing without racial discrimina-  
4 tion, Japanese should abandon all of their superior  
5 complex and the sense of special rights over that area.  
6 They must realize that they stand on an equal footing  
7 with the Manchurian people in constituting this new  
8 state whether as government officials or civilians. I  
9 suggest that those who serve the new country as govern-  
10 ment officials should have such determination as to  
11 naturalize themselves to that country.  
12

13           "Maladministration of Chang Hsueh-liang was  
14 the cause of hatred, not only of the governmental  
15 authorities of Japan and Manchuria, but also of all of  
16 the thirty million Manchurian people. Chang Hsueh-  
17 liang's failure with the Manchurian people lay in his  
18 adoption of sole party policy. One thing Manchuria  
19 should be most careful about in the future is to respect  
20 the will of the people by rejecting the return of Chang  
21 Hsueh-liang and his party.  
22

23           "Restoration of imperial regime in Manchuria  
24 would be an act of anachronism; furthermore, it is apt  
25 to give birth to an evil cause which will deprive Man-  
churia forever of her possible opportunity of harmonizing

1 with China in the future. Even if Mr. Henry Pu-Yi  
2 were to become the head of the new state in compliance  
3 with the request of thirty million Manchurian people,  
4 there must be a clear distinction between his assumption  
5 as head of the state and the restoration of imperial  
6 regime.

7 "Independence of the new state is the result  
8 of a movement of a race freeing itself from the nation  
9 to which it belonged, and so it is not in any way  
10 violating any treaty. Those influential Manchurian  
11 people of the present should be fully responsible to  
12 the people of Manchuria.

13 "It is feared that the independence of a new  
14 state may overshadow the path to cooperation between  
15 China and Japan, but at the same time, it is possible  
16 that the new state, by administering good rule, can  
17 work as a tie for China-Japan collaboration in the  
18 future, and we must hope that this should be the case  
19 with the coming new state.

20 "What everything depends upon is good adminis-  
21 tration and the welfare of the people. The misgoverning  
22 in the past, administered by the former military clique,  
23 should of course be improved. First of all, the heavy  
24 extortion of tax should either be abolished or alleviated.  
25 All laws purporting to be anti-Japanese should

immediately be abolished.

1           "The Kwantung Army should be indifferent to  
2 all political affairs of Manchuria. It should leave  
3 all the administrative matters of the new state to the  
4 independent and autonomous regime of the Manchurian  
5 people, and should solely limit its action, as its guiding  
6 principle, to assisting the maintenance of law and order.  
7 However, the national defense should be a problem for  
8 the joint strength of Japan and the new state, and,  
9 for the time being, the Kwantung Army should appoint  
10 itself to this task.

11           "The Kwantung Army must convince, and gain  
12 absolute confidence of the Manchurian people as being  
13 their friend. So far, the Japanese Government gave  
14 us those prohibitive instructions only, such as pro-  
15 hibiting us from participating in political and adminis-  
16 trative matters, or instructions to avoid restoration  
17 of imperial regime, and no definite indication as to  
18 the future policy of the Kwantung Army has been shown  
19 by them. We presume it is only natural under the cir-  
20 cumstances. What we should do at this juncture is,  
21 while devoting our undivided attention to our primary  
22 duty as an army, we must make close observation upon  
23 the future relation between Manchuria and Japan in  
24 order to be able to report the true aspect of the  
25

1 ~~si~~ ~~ation~~ to the central government, and, at the same  
2 time, should be determined not to interfere with their  
3 political movement which is intended to represent the  
4 unanimous desire of thirty million Manchurian people  
5 of immediately saving the present situation of turmoil.  
6 While we should not be reluctant in giving assistance  
7 within our power to the Manchurian people whenever asked  
8 for it, we must not force ourselves upon them.

9 Kuomintang politics, and, consequently, the observance  
10 of the principle of the 'Hokyo Anxin' (the border  
11 security and the peace for people) that is to say,  
12 ardent desire for independence of Manchuria. Mr. Lo  
13 Chen-yu, the authoritative person of the faction of  
14 the Restoration, came from Lushan (Port Arthur) to  
15 see me at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, at  
16 Mukden, on the 23rd September, immediately after the  
17 incident. He told me then that the faction for the  
18 Restoration wished to call the Emperor Hsuan Tung to  
19 Manchuria. He then went to see Hsi Chia in Kirin where  
20 he met Chang Hsi-peng at Taonan, and came back again  
21 to Mukden on the 26th September. He then told me that  
22 at Kirin, Chang Hsi-peng who was preparing for the  
23 independent movement was desirous of welcoming the  
24 Emperor Hsuan Tung to Kirin, and of the firm decision  
25 of General Chang Hsi-peng for independence and his  
intention to support the Emperor Hsuan Tung. Mr. Yu

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1 "9. I had been taking every opportunity to  
2 talk with the Chinese leading authorities and power-  
3 ful civilians to ascertain their views, so that I  
4 could report them to the Military Commander.

5 I learned that among those personages there  
6 prevailed, as a common sentiment, a strong feeling of  
7 animosity against Chang Hsueh-liang, a dislike of the  
8 Kuomintang politics, and, consequently, the observance  
9 of the principle of the 'Hokyo Anmin' (the border  
10 security and the peace for people) that is to say,  
11 ardent desire for independence of Manchuria. Mr. Lo  
12 Chen-yu, the authoritative person of the faction of  
13 the Restoration, came from Lushun (Port Arthur) to  
14 see me at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, at  
15 Mukden, on the 23rd September, immediately after the  
16 incident. He told me then that the faction for the  
17 Restoration wished to call the Emperor Hsuan Tung to  
18 Manchuria. He then went to see Hsi Chia in Kirin where  
19 he met Chang Hai-peng at Taonan, and came back again  
20 to Mukden on the 26th September. He then told me that  
21 at Kirin, Chang Hai-peng who was preparing for the  
22 independent movement was desirous of welcoming the  
23 Emperor Hsuan Tung to Kirin, and of the firm decision  
24 of General Chang Hai-peng for independence and his  
25 intention to support the Emperor Hsuan Tung. Mr. Yu

1 Chung-han had an interview with army commander HONJO  
2 on the 3rd, November, and suggested to him the neces-  
3 sity of establishing a new state on the basis of his  
4 cherished principle of the 'Border security and the  
5 peace for the people.' Within a short time after the  
6 incident, in many provinces and districts, independence  
7 was declared. At that time we got information to the  
8 effect that the movements of establishing an independ-  
9 ent state were gradually growing among the principal  
10 political leaders in various districts, since the  
11 general tendency in the provinces of Mukden, Kirin,  
12 and Heilungkiang had been settled, by the entry of the  
13 Japanese army into Tsitsihar in the middle of November  
14 of the 6th Year of Showa (1931). So I successively  
15 interviewed, by order of the army commander, during  
16 the period from the latter part of November to the  
17 middle of December, the political leaders of the  
18 various districts who were the supporters of independ-  
19 ence. Among them: Such well known personages of the  
20 Restoration "Mr. Chang ching-hui at Harbin of the  
21 Province "Mr. Ma Chan-shan at Hailun, both of the  
22 Kirin "Messrs. Hsi Chia and Hseh Chieh-shin at Kirin  
23 Xi an "Messrs. Tsang Shih-i and Yuan Chin-kin at  
24 Mukden "I thus met with the leaders of independent  
25

1 states and heard their opinions about the problem of  
2 establishing a new state. They were, without excep-  
3 tion, against the return of the Chang Hsueh-liang \*  
4 regime to Manchuria, as they did not want the Nanking  
5 Government in Manchuria, as they hated the politics  
6 of the Kuomintang. Their common and earnest desire  
7 was to take active steps to establish an independent  
8 state, on the basis of the principle of 'border secur-  
9 ity and the peace for people.' They earnestly and  
10 frankly told me that, for the construction of a new  
11 state, the support of Japan was absolutely necessary,  
12 that for the time being the defense must be assumed  
13 by Japan, and that the new state required general  
14 modern knowledges for which they would depend upon  
15 Japanese aid, and that in order to realize the fruit  
16 of co-operation, the Japanese and Chinese should stand  
17 on equal footing. There were some differences of  
18 opinion among them about the question of its polity  
19 and sovereignty. Such well known personages of the  
20 Restoration faction as Hse Chia, Governor of the  
21 Province of Kirin; and Hseh Chieh-shih, both of the  
22 Kirin faction, strongly advocated calling in Mr. Pu  
23 Yi as the sovereign, after making Manchuria an inde-  
24 pendent state, rather than persistently sticking to a  
25 mere theory of restoration itself.

1 Tsang Shih-i, Governor of the Province of Mukden,  
2 and Yuang Chin-kai, both of the Mukden faction, were  
3 strongly opposed to the maladministration of Chang  
4 Hsueh-liang, and though they were advocates of the  
5 principle of the 'border security and the peace for  
6 the people,' they did not agree to the monarchical  
7 restoration. They desired an independent state with  
8 a republican regime. As to the sovereign, however,  
9 they were of the opinion that they would agree to  
10 install Mr. Pu Yi as the President, rather than to  
11 decide the ruler by election. Ma Chan-shan of the  
12 Province of Heilungjiang was not the Governor of the  
13 Province at that time, but he was a man of real worth  
14 possessing his own troops. It was said that regarding  
15 the question of establishing a new state he would yield  
16 entirely to the opinion of Chang Ching-hui who, having  
17 almost the same view with the men of Mukden faction,  
18 was against the Restoration, but was in favor of an  
19 independent state in the republican system. All the  
20 Mongolian princes were of the same opinion as the Kirin  
21 faction. Accordingly, the authoritative persons of  
22 the Mukden and Kirin factions were in the position to  
23 dominate the general trend of the affairs as to the  
24 questions of polity and sovereignty.  
25

"It was clear that all the political leaders

1 of the various districts unanimously agreed on the  
2 formation of an independent State. This was mainly  
3 due, I found out, to the peculiar geographical and  
4 historical position of the 'East Four Provinces,'  
5 and especially to the fact that the 'East Four  
6 Provinces' had heretofore often declared themselves  
7 independent, and that by the Japanese declaration of  
8 non-occupation of Manchuria the unsatisfied political  
9 leaders who were indignant with Chang Hsueh-liang over  
10 his maladministration, came to the surface of the  
11 political scene, and moved by political aspiration  
12 desired to eternally solidify their position, reject-  
13 ing the Chang's return to Manchuria. I made a detail-  
14 ed report to the Military Commander HONJO about the  
15 matters above related.

16 "10. I, having been called by telegram from  
17 the Central authority and comprehending the designs of  
18 the army commander HONJO, left Mukden for Tokyo on the  
19 4th day of January, 7th Year of Showa (1932). Present-  
20 ing myself at the Military Headquarters and War Mini-  
21 stry, I made reports as follows:

22 "(1) That the general tendency of Manchuria  
23 was toward an independent State. After having  
24 assiduously sounded the prominent authoritative persons  
25 and men of real worth in the outside of official

1 circles, I could affirm that they were all earnestly  
2 advocating the creation of an independent State, and  
3 that the general public, too, were against, not only  
4 the return of Chang Hsueh-liang's regime to Manchuria,  
5 but also against the advance of Kuomintang Government  
6 to Manchuria.

7 "(ii) That the Kwantung Army was entirely  
8 absorbed in the maintenance of the public peace, and  
9 that is placed no limit on the political desires of  
10 the native people;

11 "(iii) That if the matter should go as it  
12 was, an independent State would undoubtedly be formed,  
13 so that the Japanese Government should be well pre-  
14 pared to meet the situation;

15 "(iv) That the Commander HONJO was of the  
16 opinion that there remained no other way than to  
17 adopt the theory of an independent State, in view of  
18 the general trend of the situation at that time.

19 "Then the War Minister ARAKI told me that  
20 though the Government policy was not decided yet, as  
21 the new cabinet had just been constructed, his prin-  
22 ciple was to observe the actual situation on the spot,  
23 but as to the issue of the independence of the State  
24 he did not interfere one way or the other. During my  
25 stay in Tokyo I explained in detail the new conditions

1 in Manchuria and the Central authorities well under-  
2 stood regarding the actual situation.

3 "Coming back to Mukden, I submitted my  
4 report to the Commander HONJO, concerning the above  
5 liaison affair with the Central authorities.

6 "11. By order of Commander HONJO I had an  
7 interview with Mr. Pu Yi in Port Arthur on January 29,  
8 1932 (7th Year of Showa). An enthusiastic desire for  
9 the creation of an independent State had become extreme-  
10 ly strong among the powerful as well as the general  
11 public of Manchuria at that time and the tendency of  
12 forming such a new State, apart from the Restoration  
13 movement reached its high pitch with the probability  
14 of having Mr. Pu Yi, the ex-Emperor of Hsuan Tung who  
15 has a close connection with Manchuria, as the sovereign  
16 of the new State.

17 "So Commander HONJO ordered me to meet  
18 officially with Mr. Pu Yi and ascertain his intention  
19 regarding this matter. I first gave Mr. Pu Yi a  
20 general information concerning the establishing a new  
21 state, and then asked his opinion about it. Mr. Pu Yi  
22 was already aware of the trend in Manchuria for the  
23 establishment of a new state through the information  
24 he had obtained from various sources. He declared  
25 that it was of great necessity to establish a new

1 independent State in Manchuria, seceding from China,  
2 and to have a good administration for the sake of the  
3 30,000,000 inhabitants there, in close co-operation  
4 with Japan. He also stated that he had the intention  
5 to accept the sovereignty of the new State. He also  
6 insisted upon the Restoration and the conversation  
7 lasted for several hours. The main reasons were as  
8 follows:

9       "(1) The courteous treatments and conditions  
10 afforded to the Ching family did not abolish the title  
11 of 'Emperor.' So he was still an Emperor. Consequent-  
12 ly, he could not accept any post which did not carry  
13 this title;

14       "(2) The cultural level of the people of  
15 Manchuria being low, the Imperial Rule was necessary;

16       "(3) As to the system of the Imperial Rule,  
17 a general cabinet had to be established, in subord-  
18 ination to a political organ under the direct control  
19 of the Emperor who shall decide himself all the state  
20 affairs.

21       "I wondered whether the real intention of Mr.  
22 Pu Yi was to decline to accept the sovereignty of a  
23 new state if the state was not formed according to the  
24 principle of the Monarchial Restoration, or whether he  
25 would accept the offer to be the head of the new state

1 any way. However, as the interview lasted pretty  
2 long already, I took my leave, and in another room I  
3 met Cheng Chui, the sone of Cheng Hsiao-hsu, whom I  
4 asked if Mr. Pu Yi had an idea to refuse to become the  
5 head of the new State. He was very much astonished  
6 at that and said that could not be so; on the con-  
7 trary he thoroughly understood the present day  
8 political situation and was ready to accept the offer  
9 to become the head of a new State. He further ex-  
10 plained to me that, though he did not know the true  
11 meaning of Mr. Pu Yi's talk to me, he thought that it  
12 must have been, perhaps, a simple expression of his  
13 desire before accepting the office. Then I asked him  
14 if I could construe the attitude of Mr. Pu Yi as  
15 meaning he would agree to become the head of the new  
16 State, and if I could make report to Commander HONJO  
17 to that effect. He said, 'Yes.' Then I left Port  
18 Arthur for Mukden and submitted my report to the  
19 Commander HONJO.  
20

21 "The object of my interview with Mr. Pu Yi  
22 was not to persuade him to become the head of the new  
23 State, but merely to learn his intention. I had  
24 absolutely no notion whatever or acted in such a way  
25 as to coerce or intimidate Mr. Pu Yi, or to cause his  
advisor Cheng Chui to make Mr. Pu Yi agree to become

1 head of the new State.

2 "Later on, on the 21st of February Lo Chen-  
3 yu and his sone came to see me at the Headquarters of  
4 the Kwantung Army, saying that they were sent by the  
5 Emperor Pu Yi. They said that the Emperor was still  
6 contending for the Imperial Rule of the new State.  
7 However, at that time, the North-East Administration  
8 Committee had already issued, on the 18th of February, +  
9 the Declaration of Independence, and decided on the  
10 19th that they should establish republican State and  
11 that Mr. Pu Yi, the ex-Emperor Hsuan Tung be requested  
12 to accept the administratorship.

13 his approval. Mr. Pu Yi, who had insisted, at our  
14 first interview, on February 29, on the Imperial Rule  
15 for the new State as his doctrine, and who later indicated  
16 to us through his chief retainer Lo Chen-yu, that his  
17 intention was unaltered, gladly accepted, nevertheless,  
18 the decision of the North-East Administration Committee,  
19 immediately upon being explained the details of that  
20 decision. He also gladly accepted the decision of the  
21 North-East Administration Committee in regard to the  
22 title of the State, the national flag, the site of  
23 metropolis and the name of era. In the midst of our  
24 talk I had a telephone call from the Commander HONZO  
25 and reported the progress of our interview to him.

1            "We, therefore, considered that this move of  
2       Lo Chen-yu was due to the lack of adequate knowledge  
3       on the part of Mr. Pu Yi of the atmosphere of the  
4       North-East Administration Committee. So we saw the  
5       necessity of directly communicating to Mr. Pu Yi the  
6       actual situation of the North-East Administration  
7       Committee, and by order of Commander HONJO I took  
8       the night train that day for Port Arthur. On the next  
9       day, the 22nd, I met Mr. Pu Yi and conveyed to him that  
10      information. Mr. Pu Yi understood the circumstances,  
11      was already acquainted with the decision taken by the  
12      North-East Administration Committee, and expressed  
13      his approval. Mr. Pu Yi, who had insisted, at our  
14      first interview, on February 29, on the Imperial Rule  
15      for the new State as his doctrine, and who later indicated  
16      to us through his chief retainer Lo Chen-yu, that his  
17      intention was unaltered, gladly     ted, nevertheless,  
18      the decision of the North-East Administration Committee,  
19      immediately upon being explained the details of that  
20      decision. He also gladly accepted the decision of the  
21      North-East Administration Committee in regard to the  
22      title of the State, the national flag, the site of  
23      metropolis and the name of era. In the midst of our  
24      talk I had a telephone call from the Commander HONJO  
25      and reported the progress of our interview to him.

1 "The incident of the 18th September was a  
2 pure accident and I definitely state that the Kwantung  
3 Army did not plan it. As to the establishment of  
4 Manchukuo and the installation of Mr. Pu Yi, I state  
5 they were carried out by the naturally created enthus-  
6 iasm of the native people, and there was no so-called  
7 puppet state or puppet administrator created by the  
8 schemes or threats of the Japanese Government, or of  
9 the Kwantung Army.

10 "The allegation by the prosecution that I and  
11 a few other staff officers schemed and acted arbitrarily  
12 without following the desires of the Commander-in-Chief,  
13 General HONJO, is a fabrication and as far as I am con-  
14 cerned, I affirm, there is not an iota of truth in it.

15 "II. MY SECOND PERIOD OF SERVICE IN THE  
16 KWANTUNG ARMY. (August 1, 1932-1 March 1937)

17 "1. I was attached to Kwantung Army's  
18 Headquarters (Chief of the Military Intelligence Corps  
19 at Mukden, 1 August 1932-June 1933), to the General  
20 Staff (on an inspection tour in Europe, June 1933),  
21 to the Kwantung Army's Headquarters (Supreme advisor  
22 of the Military Administration Department of Manchukuo,  
23 1 August 1934-10 December 1934) and then was assigned  
24 to the position of the Vice-Chief Staff Officer of the  
25 Kwantung Army (concurrently of an Attache to the Embassy

1 10 December 1934-21 March 1936) and of the Chief  
2 Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army (concurrently of a  
3 member of the Japan-Manchurian Joint Economic Committee,  
4 21 March 1936-1 March 1937).

5 "2. The following was the situation about  
6 1934 or 1935:

7 "(a) After the truce at Tangku, continuous  
8 efforts were made by Chinese and Japanese well informed  
9 circles to alleviate the tension between the two  
10 nations and to eradicate the causes of future evils.  
11 Consequently, traffic was opened and mail system es-  
12 tablished between the two nations after September 1934.  
13 Foreign Minister HIROTA made a speech on the two nations  
14 rapprochement before the Diet in January, to which  
15 replies were made by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Chiao Ming  
16 and finally, in June, an Amity Law was promulgated.

17 "(b) In view of the Chinese Communist Army's  
18 northward expansion with the aims to intensifying the  
19 strain between Japan and China, the Chinese Government  
20 issued an order to exterminate that army (February 1935),  
21 assigning Yu Hsun-Chung at the head of the expeditionary  
22 army (June 1935). The Chinese Communist Army, neverthe-  
23 less, broke through the Chinese Nationalist Army and  
24 was drawing near the Mongolian Region.

25 "(c) The U.S.S.R. persisted in accusing Japan

1 of being imperialistic and aggressive. It was double  
2 tracking the Siberian Railway and proceeding with  
3 fortification of the Far East for military bases. The  
4 strength of the U.S.S.R. was four times as large as  
5 that of the Kwantung Army and was being still further  
6 increased.

7 "(d) Armed communists and bandits in Manchuria  
8 were much curbed by the Japanese and Manchurian expedit-  
9 ionary forces, though not entirely suppressed.

10 "(e) Some Japanese and Manchurian notables  
11 were beginning to advocate that Japan should abolish  
12 her extraterritoriality in Manchuria.

13 "Judging from the situation stated above, if  
14 the principle of co-prosperity advocated by Japan and  
15 Manchukuo should succeed in forcing out the designs  
16 of the communist power, Japan, Manchuria and China  
17 would be able to pursue permanently the way of prosperity  
18 in peace.

19 "Whereas, the three nations would be thrown  
20 into the quagmire of war and revolt, if Japan's advocacy  
21 should fail and the situation should develop in favor  
22 of the communists. The above prospect became all the  
23 more probable after the commintern, holding a general  
24 meeting at Moscow in July 1935, passed a resolution to  
25 concentrate on efforts to overthrow Japan and

1 accomplishing world revolution, and the Chinese  
2 Communist party issued a proclamation on the basis  
3 of the said resolution, to substitute the principle  
4 of 'resist Japan and save the Nation movement', and  
5 also by their threat to resort to the tactics of the  
6 anti-Japanese united front and announcing its resolution  
7 to put these programs into action.

8 "3. The consensus of opinion of the Kwantung  
9 Army's Headquarters under the commander and the chief  
10 of the General Staff was that the basic policies to be  
11 adopted by Japan and Manchukuo should be as follows:

12 "(a) Strengthening ourself by:

13 "1. Construction of co-prosperity society.

14 "2. Financial construction centering around  
15 improving the national wealth and enriching the national  
16 resources.

17 "3. Securing the national defensive power enough  
18 to ensure peace and order, and in an emergency strong  
19 enough to check any enemy invasion.

20 "Establishing international friendship by  
21 diplomatic means.

22 "(b) Tiding over the impending crisis through  
23 the above measures.

24 "(c) The realization of harmonious cooperation  
25 of the races in Manchukuo in order to achieve the above

1 mentioned principles:

2 "4. While I was Chief of the General Staff  
3 of the Kwantung Army, Manchukuo had many persons of  
4 broad views and high personality. As for me, I trusted  
5 and cooperated with them in their policy in accordance  
6 with the intentions of my superior officers.

7 "In June 1936, the first abolishment of the  
8 extraterritoriality took place. Since the outbreak  
9 of the Manchurian Incident I had favoured this. So,  
10 also, in consideration of the trend mentioned above,  
11 I tried to aid the work of the concerned Japanese and  
12 Manchurian personages and to facilitate its material-  
13 ization.

14 "I assisted concerning the personal affairs  
15 of the Japanese officials in the service of the Manchuria  
16 Government, in accordance with the order of the Commander  
17 of the Army. I had nothing to do with the internal  
18 personal administration and the personal affairs of  
19 Manchukuo officials.

20 "The Kwantung Army did not coerce the Manchukuo  
21 Government in its selection or dismissal of its officials

22 "5. Implementing the national defense against  
23 the U.S.S.R. was the basic duty of the Kwantung Army  
24 and the basic principal thereof was established at the  
25 time of Chief of Staff NISHIO, whom I succeeded as Chief

1 of Staff. The program established by the Kwantung Army,  
2 however, was based, of course, upon the instruction of  
3 the General Staff and was of purely defensive nature with  
4 the object of providing for the emergency which would  
5 be precipitated by an attack by the U.S.S.R. We never  
6 made any aggressive war plan, much less one for  
7 aggressive war against the Soviet and Mongolia.

8 "6. There were many Mongolians in the interior  
9 of Manchuria and their living places were found even  
10 along the railway between Changchun and Dairen. Accord-  
11 ingly the trends in the Outer and Inner Mongolia involved  
12 sharp repercussion on the Mongolians living in Manchukuo,  
13 and became problems of the domestic peace and of the  
14 defense of Manchukuo.

15 "Accordingly the Kwantung Army and Manchukuo  
16 always had a special interest in Outer and Inner Mongolia.

17 "Inner Mongolia was assigned as a region in  
18 charge of the Kwantung Army for collecting information  
19 concerning the U.S.S.R. and Mongolia, and it was under  
20 this assignment that the Kwantung Army dispatched  
21 intelligence agents and collected information in Inner  
22 Mongolia near the frontier line between Manchuria and  
23 Mongolia.

24 "The influence of the northward expansion of  
25 the Chinese communist army and the foundation of

1 Manchukuo and other factors combined to give rise to  
2 Inner Mongolian's voluntary movement for uniting all  
3 Mongolians under the banner of local self-government.  
4 In this connection Japan and Manchukuo hoped for its  
5 healthy growth from the angle of defense against the  
6 U.S.S.R. and prevention of the spread of Bolshevism,  
7 but the Kwantung Army did not seek to induce or support  
8 the movement, so far as I know.

9 "The Kwantung Army, from the viewpoint of  
10 defense against the U.S.S.R., was interested in the  
11 North China problem to secure peace in the rear in  
12 case of emergency, but even that interest was diverted  
13 to concentrate on the defense of the northern and  
14 internal fortification of Manchukuo toward December  
15 1945. Accordingly, it is by no means a fact that the  
16 Kwantung Army sent troops to the North China."

17 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break  
18 before starting a new phase of his activities.

19 We will adjourn until half-past nine tomorrow  
20 morning.

21 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was  
22 taken until Wednesday, 8 October, 1947, at 0930.)

23 - - -  
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25